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The current study examined the role of motor and visual perceptual input for 20 and 28-month-
old toddlers’ emergent pretend play representations.  Action was hypothesized to guide and 
support toddlers’ representations in pretend play. Ninety-seven toddlers aged 20 and 28 months 
were tested on a task adapted from Tomasello, Striano & Rochat (1999) in which they fed a 
stuffed worm pretend replica and substitute toys.  Both motor and visual perceptual inputs were 
manipulated.  Motor input played a significant role depending on the type of pretend play toy.  
With replica toys, motor perceptual input had little effect on toddlers’ ability to comprehend and 
reproduce play with replica toys.  However, with substitute toys, which are visually dissimilar 
from their referents, toddlers comprehended the task only when they had a combination of motor 
input from their own and others’ actions.  Findings are discussed in terms of common coding 
theory and DeLoache’s dual representation model.  A modification of the paradigm is also 
proposed. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The second year of life marks one of the most remarkable and exciting periods in all of human 
development.  This year sees dramatic developments in children’s social skills and social 
understanding.  Children become capable of communicating with others through language 
(Clark, 1993), understanding the intentions of others’ actions (Meltzoff, 1995), and coordinating 
their attention and actions with adult (Barresi & Moore, 1996; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner 
1993) and peer partners (Brownell, 1988; Howes, Unger, & Smith, 1989; Smiley, 2001).  Not 
least among these social-cognitive accomplishments is children’s emerging capacity to become 
absorbed in an imaginative world of their own choosing (Fein, 1981; Harris & Kavanaugh, 
1993).    Children’s ability to engage in pretense represents their first introduction into the 
uniquely human worlds of fiction, fantasy, and make-believe (Barresi & Moore, 1996). 
The last 30 years have seen great theoretical and empirical interest in our understanding 
of the development and cognitive architecture of pretend play.    Research on young children’s 
pretend play competence has also been marked by significant debates on which forms of 
representation are necessary and sufficient for pretense (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Leslie, 
1987; Lillard, 2001; Nichols & Stich, 2000; Perner, 1991; Tomasello, Striano & Rochat, 1999).  
These debates often take the form of yes or no questions about children’s capacity for pretend.  Is 
meta-representation necessary to engage in pretense or not (Leslie, 1987; Perner, 1999)?  Do 18 
month olds to 3 year olds’ apparent pretend  play engagement reflect sophisticated cognitive 
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understanding of pretense actions (Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006) or do they  merely have a  
superficial understanding of their own and others’ pretend play actions (“behaving-as-if” theory 
(Harris, 1994; Jarrold, Carruthers, Smith & Boucher, 1994; Lillard, 1994)?   At the heart of all 
these debates have been two questions, “Do young children understand pretense or don’t they?” 
and, “At what age do they understand?”   
The drawback to framing questions about toddlers’ pretense competence as a binary, “yes 
or no” problem has been driven primarily by the assumption that children’s pretense cognition is 
largely independent of the environmental context in which it occurs and that pretense 
representations precede and drive pretense actions.  However one drawback to framing questions 
in this way is that it does little to explain age-related variation in tasks of toddlers’ and 
preschoolers’ pretend play comprehension.   For example, although children first begin imitating 
pretense actions by 18 months of age (Watson & Fischer, 1977), and correctly follow directions 
to engage in pretense by 26 months of age (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993), they do not appear to be 
capable matching pretense toys to their referent objects until 35 months of age (Tomasello et al., 
1999).    Moreover, only by 4 or 5 years of age, do children correctly report that a character  with 
no knowledge of rabbits and no intention to act like a rabbit is not pretending if it is hopping up 
and down like a rabbit (otherwise known as the “Moe” task; Lillard, 1993, 1998; Richert & 
Lillard, 2002).    
1.1 EXPLAINING CHILDREN’S PERFORMANCE ACROSS PRETENSE TASKS 
If the capacity for pretense is conceptualized as something children either have or don’t have, the 
discrepancies found across these tasks make little sense.   If children understand pretend play 
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enough to imitate it (Watson & Fisher, 1977) or follow pretense instructions (Harris& 
Kavanaugh, 1993) by the time they are toddlers, why do they fail so abysmally on other tasks of 
pretence competence until they are preschoolers (Tomasello et al., 1999; Lillard, 1993, 1998).   
Indeed, such variability in children’s performance across paradigms is often attributed to 
methodological inadequacy in assessing toddlers’ “true” capacity for pretend play.  Researchers 
have questioned whether experimental paradigms utilizing imitation (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; 
Tomasello et al., 1999) or verbally prompted action (Tomasello et al., 1999) could ever provide 
valid assessment of toddlers’ capacity for pretense representation.  They have also questioned 
whether 18 to 26-month-old toddlers’ performance can be explained by lower level cognitive 
mechanisms such as blind mimicry (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993), simply following directions 
(Tomasello et al., 1999) or “behaving-as-if” they are pretending (Lillard, 2001).   Others have 
questioned whether a task (e.g. such as the “Moe task”) which requires verbal report is too 
verbally complex to be a true measure of toddlers’ and preschoolers’ understanding of the 
necessary and sufficient criteria for pretend play (Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006).   
Instead of conceptualizing the capacity for pretense representation as a one-time 
cognitive achievement, young children’s varying performance on these different pretense tasks 
could also reflect how pretend play representations develop and in which environmental 
conditions children’s competence for pretense can shine.   Which contextual elements support 
the most primitive forms of pretend competence?  Rather than making a case that just one of 
these studies accurately measures toddlers’ “true” capacity for pretend representation, perhaps all 
of them can provide “true” measures of the development of pretense representation depending on 
which contextual factors are present.  For example, children imitate pretense actions with toys 
that are similar to their referents (replica toys such as a toy phone) than with toys that are more 
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visually dissimilar (substitute toy such as a banana; Tomasello et al, 1999; Watson & Fisher, 
1977).  Both of these imitative actions could reflect true pretend competence with varying levels 
perceptual support.  Viewed from this perspective, the pattern of age-related variation across 
these differing tasks provides insight into the contextual factors which support early pretend play 
cognition and the ways in which children’s pretense representations develop (Siegler, 1994).   
What contextual factors could explain this pattern of results? One likely candidate is 
children’s opportunity for action during tasks of pretense comprehension.   In addition to the 
methodological differences between the previously summarized pretend tasks, these tasks also 
differ in the opportunities they give children to engage in actions with pretend toys.  Thus, 
correspondingly, they also differ in the amount of direct motor perceptual input children receive 
during the comprehension task.  Children first appear to understand pretend at 18 months when 
they are fully physically engaged in the pretend play task through imitation (Elder & Pederson, 
1978; Fein, 1981; Jackowitz & Watson, 1980; Watson & Fischer, 1977).  They later demonstrate 
pretend competence at 26-28 months when acting on the direction of  pretense instructions 
(Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993), or matching pretense toys to an action (Tomasello et al., 1999) or 
completing unfinished pretend actions (Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006 ).  Finally, they show 
pretend competence also at 4-5 years of age when engaged in a verbal task in which no action is 
needed (Lillard, 1993).   Hypothesizing that action supports pretense representation may explain 
the pattern of results seen across pretense comprehension tasks.   
Could children’s actions with toys and corresponding motor perceptual input support 
their pretense representations?  Current pretense theories would answer “no.”  They propose a 
traditional view of representation as cognition that exists independent of perceptual input and 
assume that children’s pretense representations both precede and serve to guide and direct their 
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actions in play.  Action is described as “optional” for children’s pretend play engagement 
(Lillard, 2001).  However, in recent years this traditional view of representation has been 
challenged in the emerging field of embodied cognition theory and research.   
1.2 EMBODIED COGNITION 
Embodied cognition theories of perceptual symbol systems (Barsalou, 1999), situated action 
(Glenberg, 1997; Damasio, 1994), and dynamic systems (Thelen & Smith, 1994) extend and re-
conceptualize traditional views of representation (Markman & Dietrich, 2000) by maintaining 
that cognition, including pretense representation “arises from bodily interactions with the world 
and is continually meshed with them” (Thelen, 2000).  Although different theoretical models 
emphasize different aspects of embodied cognition and use different terminology, they share 
common principles that depend on a tight link between the processes of perception and 
representation (Wilson, 2002).  Therefore, unlike the traditional assumption that representation is 
independent of perceptual input, embodied cognition theory grounds representation in perception 
and action (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 2000; Thelen & Smith, 1994; van Gelder & Port, 1995). 
Specifically, representation is hypothesized to involve the internally generated re-
presentation of perceptual experience (Barsalou, 1999).   That is, the mental structures involved 
in perception are not just used for passively recording sensation but also can be used 
productively to simulate or re-present perceptual sensation.  Thus, perceptual systems serve a 
dual function to record and interpret sensation and. to re-create or re-present this sensation 
through simulation.  Representation, therefore, involves a simulated perceptual experience.  For 
example, if you were to imagine an absent toy car, you would generate a simulated perceptual 
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experience that is normally associated with the external perceptual input of the toy car.   Visual 
perceptual systems would fire as if the shape, the color of the toy car were present in the 
immediate environment.    Motor perceptual systems would fire as if you were moving the toy 
car back and forth.  There is empirical support for these proposals as neuroscience research has 
shown that these processes of re-presentation or perceptual simulation occur in adult visual and 
motor imagery (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003; Decety, 2002.)  
Furthermore, because representation involves re-presentation of perceptual experience, 
what you directly perceive can also support perceptual simulation.  What you see, hear, touch 
smell, and taste, could support the thought you hold in mind.  When external perceptual input is 
congruent with internal re-presentations, it takes less cognitive work to simulate the missing 
perceptual stimulation (Barsalou, 1999).    If you were exposed to the smell of a freshly mown 
lawn, it would be less difficult to represent “grass” because it requires the re-presentation or 
simulation of its smell.  To return to the earlier example, if you were to imagine an absent toy car 
and within your visual field is a rectangular block, made of a solid, hard material that matched 
the color of the imagined car, you would not have to engage in the cognitive work to visually 
simulate shape, solidity or color.  If you were allowed to pick up said block and move it laterally 
on a table you would not have to engage in the motor simulation of the movements normally 
associated with playing with a toy car.  Therefore, directly perceiving these elements of a toy car 
saves you the work of having to re-present them.   
Moreover, and most importantly for explaining children’s performance across pretense 
comprehension tasks, simply moving with a block in this way may also trigger your perceptual 
simulation of a car.  Action and motor perceptual input guide representation (Ganis, Keenan, 
Kosslyn & Pascual-Leone, 2000, Markman & Dietrich, 2000).  You might pick up a block and 
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move it laterally back and forth across the floor with no intention of simulating an absent toy car.  
However, the familiarity of this lateral, back and forth movement and its motoric association 
with playing with a toy car leads you to simulate or re-present a toy car.  Therefore, action, 
instead of merely being the consequence of re-presentation, can be a crucial factor in eliciting or 
generating re-presentation.   
In summary, re-conceptualizing representation as a process perceptual simulation or re-
presentation challenges the traditional view of representation found in current theories of pretend 
play.  Namely, it challenges assumptions that pretense representation occurs independently of 
perceptual input and that action is optional for pretense representation.   Because representation 
is re-conceptualized as perceptual simulation, direct perceptual input, both motor and visual, 
could facilitate pretense representation.  Moreover, action and its corresponding motor 
perception could guide pretense representation.    
1.3 EMBODIED PRETEND PLAY 
Pretend play representation, therefore, could be re-conceptualized as an embodied process of 
perceptual simulation.  To participate in pretense, such as pretending a block is a toy car, a child 
must both override and use elements of his perceived physical world.  Pretense would require 
that a child’s simulated perceptual re-presentation of the car penetrates or takes precedence over 
his or her perceptual experience of the block.  A child not only internally simulates an absent toy 
car but he may also uses this simulated perceptual experience of the toy car to override some 
elements of the externally generated perceptual experience of the present block such as the 
absence of wheels, bumpers, doors, and other elements of a car.    Meanwhile, other perceptual 
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elements of the block congruent with the re-presentation of a toy car such as its general 
rectangular shape, its solidity and lateral placement to the floor could support his perceptual 
simulation of the toy car.   
In order to be pretend play, this re-presentation of a car must also be projected onto the 
block intentionally. A child would not be pretending if he simply saw a block and thought of a 
car (Lillard, 2001).   Furthermore, if a child saw a block and mistook it for a car unintentionally, 
he would be hallucinating rather than pretending (Lillard, 2001; Perner, 1991). Thus, the child 
simulates the perceptual experience necessary for re-presenting the car and intentionally projects 
this on to his immediate perceptual experience of the actual block.  
However, this does not mean necessarily that pretense representation precedes children’s 
actions.   A child does not necessarily have to move the block with the intention of re-presenting 
a car and then projecting it on to the block.    The child’s movement with the car and the 
corresponding motor perceptual input could precede or trigger the off-line simulation/pretense 
re-presentation of the absent car.   If a child moves the block around the floor without intending 
to represent the absent car, this movement might activate a simulation of the absent car, which he 
then intentionally projects on to the block.   Action with the block and the corresponding direct 
motor perceptual input could initially bootstrap and later sustain his re-presentation of the absent 
toy car.   
To return to the earlier question, “Could children’s actions with toys and corresponding 
direct motor perceptual input support their pretense representations?”  Embodied cognition 
theories would answer with a resounding “Yes.”   Thus, re-conceptualizing pretense 
representation as embodied perceptual simulation and proposing that action could guide pretense 
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representation may help explain the patterns of performance that toddlers and preschoolers 
display across pretense comprehension tasks.    
1.4 EMBODIED PRETEND PLAY DEVELOPMENT 
The goal of the current paper is to propose that an embodied re-conceptualization of pretense 
representation can explain the developmental trends we see in toddlers’ performance on tasks of 
pretense comprehension.   When toddlers appear to understand pretense and when they don’t 
could reflect their early dependence on motor perceptual input to initiate and sustain pretend play 
re-presentation.    However, as toddlers become more skilled at motor perceptual simulation, 
they might rely less and less on motor perceptual input.   Thus, toddlers’ growing ability to 
simulate perceptual experience is hypothesized to drive observable changes in pretense 
comprehension across development.   
The current paper will focus on describing the very first shifts in children’s capacity for 
pretense re-presentation, between one and a half months and two and a half years of age in terms 
of motor perceptual input, both direct and indirect.    
1.4.1 Imitation and direct motor perceptual input 
Around 18 to 20 months of age, toddlers first engage in simple pretend play actions (Fein, 1981).  
A young toddler might bring an empty cup to his lips to “drink” absent, pretend liquid or attempt 
to “eat” a plastic strawberry.  Contrary to earlier views of pretend play as a primarily solitary 
activity (Piaget, 1965), the majority of recent research on pretend play development has 
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demonstrated that children’s earliest engagement in pretense is primarily imitative and socially 
mediated (Rakoczy, Tomasello & Striano, 2006).   
When toddlers first begin to pretend, imitation may provide the richest motor input 
because it provides children with a visual display of the model’s actions, a precise path of motion 
and, perhaps most importantly,  the motivation to move with replica and substitute toys.   This 
motion and its direct motor perceptual input may guide pretense re-presentation.   Although 
pretend actions could begin as blind mimicry of another’s actions, direct motor perceptual input 
might elicit 18-20 month olds’ pretense re-presentation and help them project this re-presentation 
on to the pretend play toy.  For example, when toddlers imitate an adult pushing a block laterally 
on the floor, they have a model for the exact path of motion and receive rich direct motor 
perceptual input from their movements which in turn could elicit their re-presentation of the 
absent toy car.  Imitation, therefore, may be an important social mechanism for early pretense by 
providing young toddlers with robust and direct motor perceptual means to elicit and sustain 
their earliest off-line perceptual simulations.   
However, if young toddlers (18-20 months) simply observe another’s pretense action 
without acting with the toy themselves, their pretense re-presentation receives no direct support 
from their own motor perceptual input.  Because toddlers have no opportunity to move with the 
toy, they may have to be more skilled at autonomous motor perceptual simulation to represent 
the absent object to which the toy refers.  For example, when young toddlers merely observe an 
adult pushing the block laterally across the floor, they might need to simulate the experimenter’s 
action in order to represent the toy car.  Young toddlers perhaps do not have this capability and 
thus, their comprehension of others’ pretense actions and corresponding capacity for pretend 
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representation might appear diminished or even non-existent (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; 
Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006; Tomasello et al., 1999).   
1.4.2 Action observation and indirect motor perceptual input 
By 26-28 months of age, though, young children demonstrate comprehension of pretense when 
simply observing another’s pretense action without acting with the toy themselves.    Children at 
this age are able to imitate incomplete pretend play actions (Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006), match 
pretense toys to others’ pretend play actions (Tomasello et al., 1999) and follow verbal directions 
to extend others’ pretense actions (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Walker-Andrews, 1999).      
Older toddlers (26-28 months) may no longer need the rich direct motor perceptual input that 
imitation provides and may be capable of the motor simulation needed for pretense re-
presentation just from watching another’s actions.  Therefore, by 26-28 months, toddlers might 
be able to simply watch an adults actions with a block and re-present the absent toy car.  Thus, 
they would comprehend the adults’ actions with little direct motor perceptual input.   
However, observing an adults’ action may still provide some indirect motor perceptual 
input.  Watching another’s pretend play action may provide 26-28 month old toddlers with a 
visual cue to activate their own internal motor simulation of the action, which, in turn, supports 
their pretense re-presentation.  For example, when a toddler watches an adult push a block, it 
might serve as an indirect cue to activate their own internal simulation of that motion.    Thus, 
when a toddler observes another’s pretense action, it could serve as an indirect visual reminder of 
which action they need to simulate in order to engage in pretense re-presentation.  Simply 
watching another’s pretense action may provide indirect motor perceptual input.  The term 
indirect motor perceptual input will be used throughout the thesis to describe this event.   
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However, without indirect motor perceptual support, 26 to 28 month olds also have 
difficulty engaging in pretense re-presentation.   If toddlers watch another’s action with a 
pretense toy and are then asked to match this pretense toy to a static display such as the 
corresponding referent object, they appear incapable of matching these static objects until 35 
months of age (Tomasello et al., 1999.).  For example, if a toddler watches an experimenter push 
a block and is then asked to choose from a series of static objects which object the block refers 
to, only by 35 months of age will he pick the correct referent, a toy car (Tomasello et al., 1999).  
In this case, toddlers may have had to independently generate motor perceptual simulation.   In 
order to see a block and re-present the absent toy car they have to re-present the actions with the 
block on their own, with no indirect motor perceptual cue.   Thus, engaging in a pretend 
comprehension task would be considerably more difficult without any indirect motor support, ie. 
without watching another person engage in the action .   
Therefore, children’s performance on tasks of pretense comprehension is hypothesized to 
reflect a progression from their need for a combination of direct and indirect motor perceptual 
input at 18-20 months of age, to indirect motor perceptual input at 26-28 months of age and 
perhaps even independence from any motor perceptual input by 3-4 years of age.   
1.4.3 Interactions between motor and visual perceptual support 
Motor perceptual input is likely not the sole perceptual factor that assists pretense re-
presentation.  The motor perceptual input children receive also probably interacts interact with 
the visual perceptual support they receive from the visual qualities of the toy such as its shape, 
solidity, color or size.  Just like motor perceptual input, visual perceptual input could support the 
representation of absent pretend referents by reducing cognitive load of re-presentation.   For 
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example, when 18-month-olds “sip” from replica spoon, the visual perceptual input from a 
replica spoon could support toddlers’ off-line perceptual simulation of an actual spoon and 
absent liquid.    Because pretense simulation is so cognitively demanding, children’s earliest 
pretend play may also be particularly dependent on the visual similarity between the pretend toy 
and the absent referent in addition to motor perceptual input.  However, as toddlers become more 
proficient in pretense, they can use toys that are progressively more visually distanced from their 
referents, a process described as “decontextualization” (Belsky & Most, 1981; Elder& Pederson, 
1978; Fenson, 1984; Fenson & Ramsey, 1980; Jackowitz & Watson, 1980; Piaget ,1965;  
Ungerer et al., 1981).   
By 20 months toddlers can use substitute toys such as a stick as a spoon (Fenson, 1984; 
Ungerer et al., 1981; Jackowitz & Watson, 1980.).   Because the stick looks considerably 
different from its referent “spoon,” representing the absent object requires considerably more 
cognitive work.  Decontextualization, therefore, could be a result of toddlers becoming more 
competent at the visual perceptual simulation necessary for pretense re-presentation (Elder, 
Zelazo, Kearsly, & O’Leary, 1981; Fein, 1981; Piaget, 1945; Striano et al., 2001).  
Thus, toddlers are hypothesized to demonstrate earliest comprehension of pretense when 
they receive motor input that supports their pretense simulation and when they engage in actions 
with pretend toys that are visually similar to their referents.  However, as children become more 
skilled at motor and visual perceptual simulation, they are expected to rely less on direct motor 
and visual input to support their re-presentation of absent objects.  The changing roles of motor 
and visual perceptual input for pretense representation, therefore, could explain developmental 
trends in children’s performance across pretend play comprehension tasks.   
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1.5 THE CURRENT STUDY 
The overarching goal of the current study was to test whether motor perceptual input could 
facilitate toddlers’ pretend play representations and explain variability in children’s apparent 
pretense comprehension.   Toddlers at an average age of 20 months and 28 months were tested 
because previous studies have suggested that these ages represent the earliest developmental shift 
in children’s abilities to comprehend pretense.  
Imitation is frequently used as a principal measure of toddlers’ understanding of social 
cognitive concepts including intention and desire understanding (for a review see Want & Harris, 
2002).    However, because one of the purposes of the current study was to experimentally 
manipulate children’s direct motor perceptual input and action with pretend play toys, imitation 
needed to be used as a means to engage children in action rather than as a measure of 
understanding.  Thus, a task was needed that used a non-imitative measure of toddlers’ pretend 
play comprehension.   
To that end, a matching paradigm developed by Tomasello, Striano & Rochat (1999) was 
adapted.    In the original study, children observed an experimenter engage in actions with four 
pretense toys and pretense comprehension was measured by children’s ability to match these 
pretense toys to referent objects or to the experimenter’s pantomimed action.  Adapting this 
matching paradigm had three advantages: First, because imitation was not used as the principal 
measure of pretense understanding, I could experimentally manipulate toddlers’ direct motor 
perceptual input by manipulating whether or not toddlers imitated the experimenter’s actions 
with the toys before being asked to match toys to their referents.  Some children were given the 
opportunity to imitate (direct motor perceptual input) and others were not (no direct motor 
perceptual input).   Second, it allowed me to experimentally manipulate toddlers’ indirect motor 
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perceptual input by manipulating whether toddlers matched pretense toys to the experimenter’s 
pantomimed actions (indirect motor perceptual input) or to static referent objects (no indirect 
motor input).  Third, because the matching task could be used with both replica and substitute 
toys, it also permitted examination of a possible interaction between motor and visual perceptual 
input.   
However, use of the paradigm had a singular disadvantages.  Toddlers’ performance on 
the task could also possibly be explained by a simple lower-level mechanism.  One possibility is 
that toddlers could match toys to the experimenter’s actions simply because they learned an 
association between the toy and action through participating in the task.  They may not have 
needed to engage in pretense re-presentation at all to be able to match pretense toys to the 
experimenters’ actions.  They would only have to know that this toy and that action go together.   
Therefore, a set of unfamiliar non-pretense toys and actions which did not require 
pretense re-presentation was also introduced.    These control toys allowed us to assess whether 
toddlers’ were capable of learning a simple association between object and action during 
participation for the task and then to control for this skill when assessing their ability to match 
pretense objects to the experimenter’s pantomimed actions. 
Thus, an adaptation of the pretense comprehension matching paradigm was used in which 
children’s opportunities for imitation (direct motor input), their observation to the experimenter’s 
action (indirect motor input), and the similarity between the pretense toy and its object referent 
were manipulated (visual input).  In addition, the matching procedure was repeated with 
unfamiliar non-pretense objects to assure that children’s performance on the task could not be 
explained by simple association learning.   
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1.6 HYPOTHESES 
Most generally, motor perceptual input was hypothesized to drive pretense re-presentation 
among young children whose ability to engage in such play is just emerging.   
Five main hypotheses were tested:  
First, motor input was hypothesized to be important to facilitate children’s pretense 
understanding.   
Children were expected select the correct toy more often when given the chance to 
receive direct motor input from imitating with the toys.    Because direct motor perceptual input 
was conceptualized to drive pretense re-presentation, it was expected that toddlers would match 
the correct toy more often when given the opportunity to imitate (direct motor perceptual input).    
Children were also expected select the correct toy more often when given the chance to receive 
indirect motor input from watching the experimenter pantomime an action with the toys.  It was 
expected that toddlers would match the correct toy more often requested to select the correct toy 
by watching the experimenter’s pantomimed action (indirect motor perceptual support).   
Direct motor input from imitating and indirect motor input from observing the 
experimenter’s action were hypothesized to interact and work synergistically to support pretense 
representation.  Toddlers were hypothesized to do best on the task they imitated the experimenter 
and were asked to match the pretense toy to the experimenter’s pantomimed action.    
Second, visual perceptual input was also hypothesized to be important for children’s 
pretense understanding.  Because, replica toys are more visually similar to their referents, it was 
hypothesized that there would be a main effect for toy such that replica toys would be easier to 
match to their referents than substitute toys when all other factors were equal.   
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However, motor input was hypothesized to interact with visual input to affect 
comprehension of the task.  It was expected that if no direct motor input (from imitating the 
experimenter’s action) or indirect motor input (from observing the experimenter’s pantomimed 
action) was present then children would show better performance with the replica toys.  
However, it was also expected if direct motor input (from imitating the experimenter’s action) 
and indirect motor input (from observing the experimenter’s action) was present, then children 
would show equal performance with the substitute toys as the replica toys.  In other words, the 
benefit of having more visually similar toys would be washed out if more motor perceptual input 
was present.   
Third, children were expected to do better on the task as they got older and were expected 
to need less direct and indirect motor perceptual input and less visual perceptual input to 
comprehend the task.   
 Younger toddlers (20 months) were hypothesized to need the most motor perceptual 
support to engage in pretense representation because their pretend representation skills are just 
emerging.  Thus, they were hypothesized to need both direct and indirect motor perceptual cues 
to engage in pretense re-presentation, more so than older toddlers.  Younger children were 
hypothesized to match the correct toy more often when they imitated the experimenter and 
matched a toy to the experimenter’s pantomimed action.  
Older children (28 months) were expected to need less direct motor perceptual support  
(from imitation) than younger toddlers and need only indirect motor perceptual input (from 
watching the experimenter’s action) to engage in pretense re-presentation.  Because older 
toddlers’ have demonstrated comprehension of pretense in other studies when they only observe 
an experimenter’s action (Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006), they were expected to have a more 
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robust capacity for pretend representation and expected to match the correct toy to the 
experimenter’s action even when they had not imitated the experimenter.   
Fourth, because imitation is conceptualized to provide rich direct motor perceptual input, 
the fidelity and frequency of toddler’s imitation with toys was also expected to predict their 
ability to match toys to referent objects or actions.  Toddlers were hypothesized to select the 
correct object more often if they engaged in more faithful and more frequent imitation of the 
experimenter’s model.   
Fifth, finally, children’s ability to match a pretense toy with an action was hypothesized 
to be unrelated their ability to learn a simple association between the pretense toy and action over 
the course of the task.  In particular, children were not expected to be able to match the correct 
control toy to the experimenter’s action and thus, children’s performance on the pretend 
matching task was not expected to be due simply to associative learning.   
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2.0  METHODS 
2.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Approximately 122 toddlers (64 boys) were recruited from 6 childcare centers or phone lists of 
toddlers in the Pittsburgh, PA metropolitan area.  Two age groups were recruited: 19-21 months 
(N = 47; 26 boys; M= 20.23 months) and 27-29 months (N= 47; 25 boys, M=28.49 months).   
These ages were chosen because toddlers at these ages demonstrate the most variability in their 
performance in tasks of replica and object substitution pretense suggesting that it is a 
developmental transition period (Watson & Fischer, 1977; Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; 
Tomasello et al., 1999).  All children or their classrooms received a small gift for participation in 
the study.   
Families were from a medium-sized urban area and varied from working class to upper 
middle class by parent report; 2% were African-American, 4% Asian , 90% Caucasian, and 4% 
Latino. All children had playgroup or child-care experience.   Thirty-two recruited participants 
could not be used for the following reasons:  They did not pass training (20 month olds, N = 9; 
28 month olds, N=1); They stopped in the middle of the task (20 month olds, N=1; 28 month 
olds N = 4); They were afraid of the apparatus used in the experiment (20 month olds, N=3); 
They refused to imitate the experimenter (20 month olds N=1; 28 month olds N=4).  In addition, 
some children’s data was unusable because of video equipment failure or experimenter error (20 
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month olds N = 4; 29 month olds N=1).   Four children (28 months) were also excluded because 
teachers reported a suspicion of developmental delay.   
2.2 APPARATUS 
All children engaged in a pretense matching task adapted from a task used by Tomasello et al. 
(1999) to study pretense comprehension.  The apparatus for this experiment was significantly 
modified.  Tomasello et al. (1999) reported significant difficulty in training younger toddlers to 
match objects by sliding them down a chute, a full fifty percent (9/18) failed to pass training 
(Tomasello et al., 1999).  The “chute” was transformed to “Wormy” a friendly Elmo™-like 
worm creature made out of an upholstered vent hose (see figure 1) mounted up on an 
upholsteredwooden base.  Wormy stood 19 inches tall and was 4 inches in diameter.1  
 
 
Figure 1. Wormy and Experimenter 
                                                 
1 Special thanks to Jenny Ganger for being the inventor of a similar apparatus and suggesting that “Wormy” might 
be useful in this task 
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I believed that “feeding” a character would be more motivating for younger children than 
merely sliding an object to the experimenter down a chute. Because Wormy had a dark mouth 
which most children found minimally intimidating, I also believed that the task would inhibit 
younger children’s impulse to put multiple objects in Wormy’s mouth, a problem Tomasello et 
al. reported in their original “chute” study.  Also I hoped that “feeding Wormy” pulled for more 
pretend play from younger toddlers because they were engaging in a fantastical, pretend-like task 
rather than sliding an object down a chute.    
A child sat on a child-size mat across from Wormy and the experimenter.  When Wormy 
was “fed” toys, the toys entered his mouth, slid down, and rested at the end of the worm, where 
the experimenter could retrieve them.   All procedures were videotaped for later coding.  A 
camera on a tripod was operated by an assistant experimenter and was placed above and behind 
the experimenter so that the child’s actions and choice of objects could be easily recorded.  The 
assistant experimenter looked through the viewfinder of the camera and did not interact with the 
children or respond to the children’s actions in any way during the task.    
2.3 OVERVIEW 
The child was introduced to the task by the experimenter stating, “This is Wormy and wormy 
likes to eat toys.  I’m going to show you which toys Wormy likes to eat.”  
The task consisted of two phases: 1) a demonstration phase and 2) a request phase.   In 
the demonstration phase, toddlers observed the experimenter engage in pretense behaviors with a 
set of four toys.  There were two demonstration conditions manipulated between subjects: 1) An 
imitation condition in which the child imitated each of the experimenter’s actions 4 immediately 
 21 
after watching the experimenter perform the action or 2) An observation condition (indirect 
motor perceptual input)  in which the child simply watched the experimenter engage in the 4 
pretense actions. 
During the request phase of the task, the experimenter placed the four pretend toys within 
the child’s reach and requested that the child “feed” each of the four toys to Wormy by stating 
“Wormy wants to eat this one.”   The request was made in one of two different ways 
manipulated between subjects:  1) An object request condition (visual perceptual input) in 
which the experimenter showed the child the referent object to which the pretend toy referred.  
For example if the experimenter previously had demonstrated “brushing” her teeth with a stick, 
she requested that the child “feed” Wormy the stick by showing the child an actual toothbrush.   
2) An action request (motor perceptual input) condition in which the experimenter pantomimed 
the previously demonstrated pretend action without the pretend toy.  For example, to request the 
stick the experimenter pantomimed brushing her teeth without the stick. 
The 2 request conditions were crossed with the 2 demonstration conditions to create 4 
groups at each age: 1) Children who had received the observation demonstration and object 
request conditions, 2) Children who had received the observation demonstration and action 
request conditions 3) Children who had received the imitation demonstration and object request 
conditions and 4) Children who had received the imitation demonstration and action request 
conditions (see table 1).   
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 Table 1.  Study Design 
  Request Condition 
  Object Action 
Observation 
Observation-Object 
(20 mos. n=12; 
28 mos. n=13) 
Observation-Action 
(20 mos. n=11, 
28 mos. n=11) Demonstration 
Condition 
Imitation 
Imitation-Object 
(20 mos. n=12; 
28 mos. n=12) 
Imitation-Action 
(20 mos. n=12, 
28 mos., n=11) 
 
These procedures were conducted with two sets of pretense toys: 1) replica and 2) 
substitute toys, manipulated within subjects and counterbalanced for order.  All objects were 
familiar to children of this age.   
Finally, children in the action request condition also received a third set of unfamiliar 
toys always presented last as a control condition 3) control toys.  These control toys were novel 
and each was paired with an unfamiliar non-pretense action.  Control toys were meant to ensure 
that children in the action request condition were not merely learning a simple association 
between toy and action during the task.   The inclusion of a third set of novel unfamiliar toys and 
actions allowed us to control for this lower-level explanation of children’s ability to match 
pretense toys to actions.         
  The entire visit was videotaped and testing procedures lasted approximately 10-15 
minutes.   
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2.4 MATERIALS 
The toys used were modified from the original Tomasello et al. (1999) study.  Because 
descriptive studies of pretend play development have repeatedly shown that toddlers first engage 
in pretend actions towards the self before pretend actions towards others (decentration, Watson 
& Fisher, 1977), all pretense actions were self-directed.   Therefore, the only toys carried over 
from Tomasello et al., (1999) were toys which afforded self-directed action.  The following toys 
were used: 
2.4.1 Training Toys 
A toy car, yellow plastic duck, a doll, and a plastic bear were used.  All of the toys are familiar to 
children of this age range and easily identifiable (see figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Training Toys 
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2.4.2 Replica toys and referent objects 
A pink toy replica bottle and corresponding real purple bottle; a yellow toy replica phone 
receiver and a beige real phone receiver; a white toy replica hairbrush and a real brown wooden 
hairbrush; and a black toy replica baseball hat and a real blue baseball cap were used (see figure 
3).  
 
Figure 3.  Replica Toys and Referent Objects 
2.4.3 Substitute toys and referent objects 
A cardboard box (used as a shoe) and a real shoe, a blue ball (used as an apple) and a real apple; 
a wooden block (used as a washcloth), and a real white washcloth and a green stick (used as a 
toothbrush), and a real white toothbrush were used (see figure 4).  
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 Figure 4.  Substitute Toys and Referent Objects 
The replica and substitute toys were all visually similar to their referent objects in shape 
but different in color to ensure that children were not simply matching on the basis of color.    
2.4.4 Control toys 
Finally, children who participated in the action request condition also received a third set of 
unfamiliar control toys: a turkey baster top, green plastic ring, a white pvc pipe adaptor, and a 
small orange horseshoe-shaped plastic ring (see figure 5).   
 
 
Figure 5. Control Toys 
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2.5 TESTING PROCEDURE 
All testing took place in the laboratory, in children’s homes, or in childcare center classrooms 
within a medium sized city.  When tested in the laboratory or at home, the children’s mothers 
were present but were instructed not to interfere with the testing or to explicitly direct their 
children’s response. When children were tested at their childcare center, they were tested in quiet 
hallways away from the distraction of their classrooms.     
2.5.1 Warm-up Play 
Children tested in the laboratory or their homes were given 10 minutes of warm-up play with the 
experimenter and assistant experimenter and a standard set of toys: a doll, tools, a cooking set, 
and a doll-sized bed and bathtub.  A warm-up period was used ensure that the children felt 
comfortable in the unfamiliar laboratory setting or in the case of children tested at home that they 
felt comfortable with the unfamiliar experimenters.     For all children tested in their childcare 
classrooms, the experimenter and assistant experimenter spent approximately 20-30 minutes 
playing with the child and his or her peers in the classroom before beginning the task.   
2.5.2 Training Task 
The experimenter introduced the child to Wormy by stating “This is my friend Wormy 
and he likes to eat toys.  Do you want to see which toys he likes to eat?”  The experimenter 
would demonstrated that each of the four objects, a duck, bear, toy car, and small plastic doll 
could slide down Wormy by pretending that Wormy was talking to her, “What’s that Wormy, 
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you want to eat the car?” and then the “feeding” Wormy the car.  The experimenter then placed 
the four toys in front of the child next to Wormy on the floor (see Figure 1).  She then instructed 
the toddler which object to slide down the chute by stating “Now it’s your turn, Wormy wants to 
eat the….” and verbally requesting each one, i.e. “ducky”, “car”, “girl,” and “bear.”  Children 
were considered ready for testing if they could send three objects correctly in a row without 
assistance.  If children needed additional prompting the experimenter would point and sweep 
across the four objects stating, for example, “Which one of these is the….car?”  The training task 
was repeated until the child met this criterion. 
2.5.3 Pretense Comprehension Task.   
As briefly mentioned, the task consisted of two phases, a demonstration phase and a request 
phase.   
2.5.3.1 Demonstration  phase.  
During the demonstration phase, each child watched the experimenter interact with a set 
of four toys.  Pretend play actions with each of the four toys were demonstrated individually.   
Each action was demonstrated three times.    In the observation condition, children were asked 
“Are you ready to play a pretend game with me? Let’s pretend.  Watch me, it’s my turn” and 
simply watched as the experimenter demonstrated each action with each toy. The four toys were 
then placed on the floor between the experimenter and the child. 
In the imitation condition, the children were asked “Are you ready to play a pretend 
game with me?  Let’s pretend.  Watch me, it’s my turn” and then given each toy individually 
immediately after the demonstration and told “Now it’s your turn.”  If children refused to imitate 
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the experimenter encouraged them by saying “Now you try, go ahead, it’s your turn.”  After the 
child had imitated the experimenter the toy was retrieved and the next toy was demonstrated and 
imitated.  When all four actions had been demonstrated to and imitated by the child, the toys 
were placed on the floor between the experimenter and child. 
In both conditions, the presentation order of the toys and the placement of the toys was 
were counterbalanced.  The experimenter smiled and looked at the children during and after the 
demonstration of each four toys, using body language commonly used in pretense to 
communicate “this is pretend.” (Lillard & Witherington, 2004; Richert & Lillard, 2004). 
2.5.3.2 Request  phase.  
During the request phase, after the four toys had been placed on the floor and were now within 
the child’s reach, the experimenter told the child “Wormy is hungry he wants to eat these toys.  
Wormy wants to eat this one. Can you feed him this one” without naming the toy.    This request 
was made either by showing the child the object to which the toy referred (object request 
condition) or by pantomiming the action (action request condition) previously demonstrated 
with the toy (details to follow). 
 If the child failed to respond, the experimenter asked the child two more times.   If the 
child failed to respond within 60 seconds or the child sled more than one toy to Wormy, the 
request was repeated. If children needed additional prompting the experimenter would sweep a 
pointed index finger across the toys and state, “Which one of these is this one.  Can you give it to 
Wormy? Could you put it in his mouth?”    After the child made his or her choice, placed the toy 
in Wormy’s mouth and the toy had traveled down the tube, it was replaced on the floor to ensure 
that the child always chose from four toys.  The toys were requested in the same order as they 
had been demonstrated  
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As briefly mentioned, the request phase had two conditions.  In the object request 
condition, the experimenter requested each of the four toys by showing the child each toy’s 
referent object one at a time while stating “Wormy wants to eat this one.  Can you feed him this 
one?”  In the action request condition, the experimenter requested each toy by pantomiming 
each of the four actions previously demonstrated with the toy while stating “Wormy wants to eat 
this one.  Can you feed him this one?”  If the child did not attend to the examiner during either 
condition, a small clicker was used to draw the child’s gaze to the referent object or action.   
The demonstration and request phases of the chute task were conducted twice with each 
child, once with replica toys, and once with substitute toys and with each child the order of 
presentation was counterbalanced. 
2.5.3.3 Replica toys.  
During the demonstration phase with the replica toys, the experimenter first introduced the 
toddler to the four target replica toys (the toy bottle, toy brush, toy phone and toy hat) and 
individually demonstrating a pretend action with each toy.  Each pretend action was 
accompanied by verbalizations which suggested the replica toy’s referent object but no object 
labels were used. For the bottle, the experimenter made slurping noises as she “drank” from the 
bottle.  With the brush, the experimenter said, “Oh, my hair is messy” as she ran the brush over 
her head.   Holding the phone to her ear, she said “Hello, hello.”  Putting the hat on she said, 
“I’m getting ready to go outside.”  Children in the observation condition simply watched these 
actions whereas children in the imitation condition were given the replica toy after each 
demonstration and encouraged to imitate the experimenters’ actions with the toys. 
Following the demonstration phase, all children were asked to choose specific toys to 
feed to Wormy in the request phase.  The four replica toys that had been used in the preceding 
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demonstration phase were set out in front of the child and the experimenter gave a specific 
request to the child to choose one to feed to Wormy.  The request phase with the replica toys had 
two request conditions, object and action request.   In the object request condition, the 
experimenter requested the replica toy by holding up the referent object for each replica toy (ie. 
an actual bottle, brush, phone receiver and hat) each one at a time.  For example, when 
requesting the toy baby bottle, the experimenter showed the child the real baby bottle while 
saying as a cue, “Wormy wants to eat this one.”  In the action request condition, the 
experimenter pantomimed the previously demonstrated actions to request that the object be fed 
to Wormy.  For example, to request the toy baby bottle, she made the same drinking movement 
by “holding” an imaginary bottle and bringing it to her lips that she had previously demonstrated.  
In this case, however, she was not holding the toy and only used  the action as a cue.  
2.5.3.4 Substitute toys.  
During the demonstration phase with substitute toys, the experimenter first introduced the 
toddler to the four substitute toys (a box, a block, a ball, and a stick) and individually 
demonstrated a pretend action with each toy.  Each pretend action was also accompanied by 
verbalizations which suggested the substitute toy’s referent object but no object labels were used.  
Specifically, the experimenter placed the box on her foot and stated “I better put these on to go 
outside.”  The experimenter took a pretend bite from the ball and made exaggerated chewing and 
munching noises.  The block was rubbed on the experimenter’s arms as she said, “I’m going to 
get clean” and the stick was used to imitate a tooth brushing action as she made brushing sounds.    
Children in the observation condition simply watched these actions whereas children in the 
imitation condition were given the substitute toy after each demonstration and encouraged to 
imitate the experimenters’ actions with the toys. 
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Following the demonstration phase, all children were asked to choose specific toys to 
feed to Wormy in the request phase.  The four replica toys that had been used in the preceding 
demonstration phase were set out in front of the child who was now to choose the correct one to 
feed to Wormy based on the experimenters’ specific request.  During this request phase, the 
experimenter requested each substitute toy in the child’s possession by either showing the 
substitute toy’s referent object (object request condition) or pantomiming the action shown with 
the substitute toy (action request condition).  In the object request condition the experimenter 
requested the substitute toy while holding up the referent object for the substitute toy (i.e. a shoe, 
washcloth, apple, and toothbrush).  For example, when requesting the box toy, the experimenter 
showed the child the real shoe while saying as a cue, “Wormy wants to eat this one.” In the 
action request condition, in contrast, the experimenter requested the substitute toy by 
pantomiming the action while stating “Wormy wants to eat this one.”  For example to request the 
box toy, she made the same putting on a shoe movement by bringing her hand to her foot that she 
had previously demonstrated.  In this case, however, she was not holding the toy only using the 
action as a cue.  
2.5.3.5 Control toys.  
Children in the action request condition in both the observation and imitation demonstration 
conditions were also shown a third set of unfamiliar control toys, always presented last (a grey 
turkey baster top, a green plastic ring, a pvc pipe adapter, and an orange plastic horseshoe).  
During the demonstration phase with the control toys, the experimenter first introduced the 
toddler to the four control toys by stating “Watch me,” and demonstrating an action with each 
one while stating “I’m doing this.”  With the turkey baster top, the experimenter squeezed the 
bulb and placed the opening on the palm of her hand making a sucking noise with the bulb.   For 
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the green plastic ring, the experimenter placed the ring with her right hand over her left fingers 
with an exaggerated motion.  The pvc pipe adapter was lightly twisted on the experimenter’s 
arm, and the small orange plastic horseshoe was brought up to the bridge of the experimenter’s 
nose.  In the observation condition, children simply watched these actions whereas in the 
imitation condition they were given each control toy after each demonstration and encouraged to 
imitate the experimenter’s actions with the toys. 
During the subsequent request phase, only the action request was used.  The experimenter 
requested the control toys stating, “Wormy wants to eat this one” while pantomiming the actions 
previously used with each of the control toys. 
Like the pretend toy sets, all of the control toys afforded self-directed actions.  Use of this 
toy set was meant to determine whether children were merely learning a simple association 
between action and toy during the task and then using this association when matching replica and 
substitute toys to the pantomimed action in the pretend toys conditions.   
2.6 CODING PROCEDURES 
Children’s performance was rated from the videotape.  An independent coder blind to the study 
hypotheses coded the videotapes.  Interrater reliability (kappa) with the first author was assessed 
on 10% of the final collected data.  In keeping with Tomasello et al.’s (1999) original protocol, 
children’s selection of toy was coded as correct if they “fed” the matching toy to Wormy.  If the 
toddler chose not to touch any toys within 60 seconds of the last request for a toy, the trial was 
scored as incorrect.  If the toddler fed two toys to Wormy and the trial was repeated, only the 
toddler’s performance on the repeated trial was scored.  Cohen’s kappa for percentage correct 
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toy choice was .78 for the replica toy set, .84 for the substitute toy set and .75 for the control toy 
set.  The score used in analyses was the percentage of correct toys selected out of four trials 
(percentage correct toy choice).   
In the imitation condition of the chute task, toddlers’ performance was additionally rated 
for each toy on a 0-3 scale where 0 is no imitation, 1 is an imitation attempt without similarity to 
the model, 2 is imitation that approximates the model, and 3 is imitation identical to the 
experimenter’s actions (kappa = .75).     These imitation ratings were averaged across toys to 
create the variable average imitation fidelity which was calculated separately for the replica, 
substitute and control toys.  The total frequency of imitation was also coded separately to create 
the variables total imitation frequency (percent agreement = .87) and percentage of toys imitated   
(kappa = .90) for the replica, substitute and control toys  
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3.0  RESULTS 
3.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES 
Means and standard deviations for 20 and 28 month olds’ percentage correct toy choice in each 
condition are presented in Table 2.  Average performance ranged between 25.00% to 61.36% 
correct toy choice depending on their age and condition. Percentages are frequently normalized 
by arcsine tranformations if they are outside the range 30% - 70% and are non-normally 
distributed.  Shapiro-Wilks tests of normality demonstrated that both percentage correct toy 
choice for replica and substitute toys were normally distributed, Shapiro-Wilks (97) = .90, 
p<.001, and Shapiro-Wilks (97) = .89, p<.001.   Thus, the variables were not transformed for 
substantive analyses.   
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Table 2. Percentage correct toy choice in each condition, toy type, and age. 
 Request Conditions 
 Object Request Action Request 
Demonstration 
Conditions 
20 month olds 
Mean (SD) 
28 month olds 
Mean (SD) 
20 month olds 
Mean (SD) 
28 month olds 
Mean (SD) 
Observation     
Replica Toys 50.00 (25.00) 57.69 (29.55) 25.00(16.67) 47.73 (32.51) 
Substitute Toys 25.00 (25.00) 36.54 (26.25) 37.50 (24.29) 40.91 (28.00) 
Control Toys --- --- 42.50 (57.95) 54.55 (31.26) 
     
Imitation     
Replica Toys 48.08 (35.09) 54.17 (35.09) 42.31 (21.37) 59.09 (23.11) 
Substitute Toys 26.92 (12.87) 31.25 (28.45) 42.31 (18.77) 61.36 (23.35) 
Control Toys ---- ---- 30.56 (24.30) 45.45 (24.54) 
1. Possible scores ranged from 0-100% correct toy choice.   
Means and standard deviations for 20 and 28 month old toddlers’ imitation variables are 
presented in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.    These means show that on average the imitation 
manipulation during the demonstration phase of the task was successful.  Children in the 
observation conditions rarely imitated the experimenter (Means for imitation frequency ranged 
from 0 to .73 and means for percentage of toys imitated ranged from 0% to 11.36 %).  In 
contrast, children in the imitation condition imitated the experimenter 4.25 to 4.36 times with 
88.64% to 100% of the toys.  
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 Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations for Imitation Frequency, Average Fidelity of 
Imitation and Percentage of Toys (of4) that Children Imitated at 20 months of age 
 Request Conditions 
 Object Action 
Demonstration Conditions Observation Mean (SD) 
Imitation 
Mean (SD) 
Observation 
Mean (SD) 
Imitation 
Mean (SD) 
Replica Toys     
Imitation Frequency 0(0) 4.33(.98) .10(.32) 4.27(1.84) 
Average Imitation Fidelity 0(0) 2.06(.26) .05(.16) 2.02(.69) 
Percentage of Toys Imitated 0(0) 95.83(9.73) 2.50(7.90) 90.91(.30) 
Substitute Toys     
Imitation Frequency 0(0) 4.33(.78) .20(.63) 4.6(2.06) 
Average Imitation Fidelity 0(0) 1.95(.23) .08(.24) 1.84(.32) 
Percentage of Toys Imitated 0(0) 97.92(7.21) 5.00(.16) 88.64(30.33) 
Control Toys     
Imitation Frequency --- ---- 0(0) 5.11(2.89) 
Average Imitation Fidelity --- ---- 0(0) 1.75(.67) 
Percentage of Toys Imitated --- ---- 0(0) 88.89(33.33) 
Possible scores for: 
1. Imitation Frequency ranged from 0-1 in the observation conditions and from 3-12 in the 
imitation condition.   
2. Average Imitation Quality ranged from 0 (no imitation of the experimenter) to 3 (identical 
duplication of the experimenter’s actions) 
3. Percentage of Toys Imitated ranged from 0 in the observation condition to 88.89% in the 
imitation condition 
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 Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations for Imitation Frequency, Average Fidelity of 
Imitation and Percentage of Toys(of 4) that Children Imitated at 28 months of age. 
 Request Conditions 
 Object Action 
Demonstration Conditions Observation Mean (SD) 
Imitation 
Mean (SD) 
Observation 
Mean (SD) 
Imitation 
Mean (SD) 
     
Replica Toys     
Demonstration Phase     
Imitation Frequency 0(0) 4.25(1.21) .09(.30) 4.36(.81) 
Average Imitation Fidelity 0(0) 2.60(.10) .05(.15) 2.52(.38) 
Percentage of Toys Imitated 0(0) 97.92(7.22) 2.27(7.53) 100(0) 
Substitute Toys     
Demonstration Phase     
Imitation Frequency 0(0) 4.33(1.30) .73(1.79) 4.09(.54) 
Average Imitation Fidelity 0(0) 2.23(.42) .25(.60) 2.41(.44) 
Percentage of Toys Imitated 0(0) 95.83(9.73) 11.36(23.35) 97.73(7.54) 
Control Toys     
Imitation Frequency --- ---- 0(0) 5.00(1.70) 
Average Imitation Fidelity --- ---- 0(0) 2.3(.26) 
Percentage of Toys Imitated --- ---- 0(0) 100 (0) 
Possible scores for: 
1. Imitation Frequency ranged from 0-1 imitated pretense action in the observation conditions and 
from 3-8 imitated pretense actions in the imitation condition.   
2. Average Imitation Quality ranged from 0, no imitation of the experimenter to 3, identical 
duplication of the experimenter’s actions 
3. Percentage of Toys Imitated ranged from 0% in the observation condition to 100% in the 
imitation condition 
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3.2 PRELIMINARY ANALYSES 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to test for specific toy effects, order effects and gender 
differences and testing location.  Previous studies have shown gender differences on pretense 
tasks with girls demonstrating a more advanced understanding (Bornstein et al., 1996; Lowe, 
1975; Taylor & Carlson, 1997).   
3.2.1 Performance Difference across Toys 
Three one-way repeated measures ANOVAs with toy as the within subjects factor, one for 
replica toys, substitute toys, and control toys, were conducted to examine whether toddlers 
selected some toys correctly more frequently than others.  The dependent variable was the 
percentage correct toy choice.   
For replica toys toddlers chose the bottle, hat, brush and phone correctly 58.60%, 
35.70%, 53.00% and 45.6%, of the time respectively.  There was a significant main effect for 
replica toy, F (3, 94) = 4.25, p = .008.  Post-hoc comparisons (Bonferroni) indicated that toddlers 
tended to match pretense toy and referent correctly more frequently with the bottle (M = 58%) 
than with the hat (M = 36%, p < .10).   No other comparisons between replica toys were 
significant.   
For substitute toys, toddlers chose the stick, block, ball and box correctly 47.70%, 
31.30%, 57.60% and 12.90%,of the time, respectively. Again, there was also a significant main 
effect for toy, F (3, 94) = 23.42, p < .001.  Post-hoc comparisons (Bonferroni) indicated that the 
box was the most difficult toy (M = 12.9 %, p < .01 compared to the block M=31.3%, p<.01; 
stick (M = 47.7%, p<.01); ball (M = 57.6%, p <.01) or the block (M = 31.3%, p < .01) Children 
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also answered correctly more frequently with the ball (M = 57.6%) than the block (M = 31.3 %, p 
< .001).  No other comparisons between substitute toys were significant.    
With the control toys, toddlers chose the baster top, pipe adapter, horseshoe and green 
ring correctly, 35.90%, 43.80% 53.20% and 40.80% of the time respectively.  No performance 
differences between control toys were found, F (3, 94) = .66, p =.59.   
 
3.2.2  Presentation Order    
A 2 (toy type: replica, substitute toy) x 2 (presentation order: replica then substitute, substitute 
then replica) ANOVA was conducted with toy type as the within subjects factor and presentation 
order as between subjects factor.  The dependent measure was the percentage correct toy choice.   
There was a significant main effect for toy type, F (1, 96) = 9.17, p<.01.    In general children did 
better with replica toys than substitute toys.  This main effect will be addressed in more detail in 
the following substantive analyses because it relates to one of the primary hypotheses.  There 
was no significant main effect for presentation order, F (1, 96) =.001, p<.96).  Children matched 
toys to their referents equally well whether the replica or substitute toys were presented first or 
last.  However, there was a marginally significant interaction between presentation order and toy 
type, F (1, 96) = 2.93, p<.10; see figure 6).  
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Figure 6. Interaction between presentation order and toy type 
 
The effect of presentation order differed depending on the toy type.  If children had 
replica toys presented first their mean percentage correct toy choice was 45.21% for the replica 
toys and 40.43% for the substitute toys.   If children had substitute toys presented first their mean 
percentage correct toy choice for the replica toys was 51.67% and 34.40% for the substitute toys. 
The interaction between presentation order and toy type rests on children’s performance when 
they received the substitute toys first.  For the children who had the substitute toy presented first 
they struggled much more with the substitute toys (34.4%) and the difference between replica 
and substitute toy percentage correct toy choice (mean difference =17.27%) was statistically 
significant, t=3.48, p<.05.  However, for children who had replica objects presented first the 
difference between replica and substitute toy percentage correct toy choice (mean difference = -
4.78%) was not statistically significant, t=.90, ns.    Moreover, because presentation order was 
 41 
counterbalanced within each demonstration and request condition, this interaction effect was 
unlikely to have played any role in differences in children’s performance across conditions.   
3.2.3 Gender comparisons 
A 2 (toy type: replica versus substitute toy) x 2 (gender) ANOVA was conducted with toy type 
as within subjects factors and gender and age between subjects factor.  The dependent measure 
was the percentage correct toy choice.  This comparison revealed no significant main effect for 
gender, F (1, 96) = .80 p=.37 or significant interactions between gender and toy type, F (1, 96) = 
.80, p=.37.    Thus, gender was not considered to play a role in children’s performance.  This is 
important because in some conditions girls outnumbered boys by one participant and in others 
boys outnumbered girls by one participant.  Differences in children’s performance between these 
conditions could not have been due to the presence or absence of children from one gender. 
3.2.4 Comparison of children tested in child care centers and in the lab 
A 2 (toy type: replica vs. substitute toy) x 8 (location of data collection: 6 child care centers vs. 
home vs. lab) ANOVA was conducted with toy type as the within subjects factor and the 
location of data collection as between subjects factor.  The dependent measure was the 
percentage correct toy choice. Analyses revealed no main effect for the location of data 
collection, F (7, 90) = .66, p=.70.  Regardless of where children were tested they performed 
equally well on the task.   
In summary, preliminary analyses revealed that children matched some toys more 
frequently to the correct referents.  With the replica toys, children found it easier to match the 
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bottle and brush.  With the substitute toys children found it easier to match the ball and the stick.   
Also, toddlers performed better with both toy sets if given the replica toys before the substitute 
toys.  However, since the presentation of toy sets was counterbalanced across subjects, this was 
unlikely to have any effect for comparisons of children’s performance across conditions.  
Preliminary analyses revealed no effect of gender or location of data collection for children’s 
performance.   
3.3 SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSES 
The primary goal of the current paper was to test the role of motor perceptual input, both direct 
(imitative) and indirect (observational) for children’s pretense re-presentation and 
comprehension.   
Substantive analyses were conducted to test the five main hypotheses and are summarized 
below:  
First, an omnibus analysis was conducted comparing children’s correct toy choice 
performance for the observation vs. imitation demonstration conditions of the task, for the object 
vs. action request conditions of the task, and for replica vs. substitute toy types as well as by age 
(20 vs. 28 month olds).   
Main effects were expected for the demonstration phase, with imitation condition (direct 
motor perceptual input) performance exceeding observation condition (no direct motor 
perceptual input) performance; for request phase with action condition (indirect motor perceptual 
input) performance exceeding object request (no indirect perceptual input) performance; for toy 
type with replica toy (rich visual perceptual input) performance exceeding substitute toy 
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performance; and for age with older toddlers’ (28 months) performance exceeding that of 
younger toddlers (20 month olds)  
Three interactions were also expected:  An interaction was expected between 
demonstration condition (observation vs. imitation) and request (object vs. action) condition.  
The difference between object and action request conditions was expected to be higher for 
children in the imitation demonstration condition than for children in the observation condition.  
Toddlers were expected to select the correct toy most frequently when they had received a 
combination of direct motor perceptual input from imitating in the demonstration condition and 
indirect motor perceptual input from seeing a pantomimed action request in the request 
condition.  
An interaction was also expected between toy type (replica vs. substitute) and 
demonstration condition (observation vs. imitation).  The difference between observation and 
imitation demonstrations was expected to be higher for children performing with substitute rather 
than replica toys.   Toddlers were expected to selecting the correct substitute toy more frequently 
when given a chance to imitate with the substitute toys.   
A three way interaction was expected between age, demonstration and imitation 
condition.  Younger toddlers (20 months) were expected to select the correct toy more frequently 
when they participated in both the imitation and action request conditions (combination of direct 
and indirect motor perceptual support). Older children (28 months) overall were expected to 
select the correct toy more frequently in the action request conditions (indirect motor perceptual 
support) but the direct motor perceptual support from imitation was not expected to have as large 
an effect on their performance as for the younger (20 months) children.   
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Second, a complementary set of analyses was conducted to compare performance in each 
condition with chance.   Although ANOVAs allow for comparisons of toddlers’ performance 
between tasks, they do not reveal whether children actually comprehended the task in each 
condition.   Comparing the percent correct toy choice with chance (in this case, 25% because 
there were 4 toys to choose from) allows us to determine in which conditions toddlers actually 
comprehended the task.    Separate comparisons of 20 month olds and 28 month olds’ percentage 
correct toy choice with chance performance were conducted within each condition.   
The same predictions for the patterns of children’s percentage correct toy choice across 
demonstration-request conditions were made as those articulated above:  Younger (20 months) 
and older toddlers (28 months) were expected to perform above chance in more conditions with 
the replica than the substitute toys.  Furthermore, older toddlers (28 months) were expected to 
perform above chance in more conditions than the younger toddlers (20 months).   
Interactions between age and demonstration and request type were also expected.   
Specifically, younger toddlers (20 months) were expected to select both the replica and substitute 
toys above chance when they had a combination of imitation demonstration (direct motor input) 
with action request (indirect motor input) because of their hypothesized reliance on a 
combination of direct and indirect motor perceptual input.  They were not expected to be able to 
perform above chance in conditions where they had no motor perceptual input, only direct motor 
perceptual input or only indirect motor perceptual input.  Thus, they were not expected to 
perform above chance in the object request condition (no indirect motor input), or in the 
observation demonstration (indirect motor input) with an action request (indirect motor input).   
However, older toddlers (28 months) were expected to select the correct toy if either 
direct or indirect motor perceptual input was available.  They were not expected to need a 
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combination of the two.  Thus, 28 month olds were expected to perform above chance in the 
imitation demonstration (direct motor input) condition and with the action request (indirect 
motor input).    That is, older toddlers were expected to perform above chance when they 
imitated the experimenter in the imitation demonstration condition (direct motor input) even in 
the object request condition (no indirect motor input) as well as they only watched the 
experimenter in the observation demonstration condition (no direct motor input) but were in the 
action request condition (indirect motor input).   
3.  Third, relations were assessed between percentage correct toy choice with the replica 
and substitute toy sets and imitation frequency, fidelity and percentage.   Toddlers were expected 
to show better task performance when imitation frequency, fidelity and percentage imitated were 
higher, regardless of age  
4. Finally, performance with the control toys was compared with chance performance. 
Children were not expected to be able to match toy and action just through simple association.  
Thus, they were not expected to perform above chance with the control toys  
Analyses are presented below:  
3.3.1 Children’s correct toy choice by demonstration and request conditions, toy type and 
age   
A 2 (demonstration condition: imitation vs. observation) x 2 (request condition: object vs. 
action) x 2 (toy type: replica vs. substitute toy x 2 (age) mixed ANOVA was conducted to test 
for overall main effects and interactions.  Demonstration and request conditions and age were 
between subjects variables while toy type was a within subjects variable.   The dependent 
variable was the percentage correct toy choice.  There was a significant main effect for age, F (1, 
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96) =7.18, p<.01 and toy type, F (1, 96) = .63, p<.01, as predicted.   In general, 28 month old 
toddlers outperformed the 20 month old toddlers (M=48% vs. M=37%, respectively) and 
selected the correct toy more often.  Also, toddlers, regardless of age or condition, selected the 
correct replica toy (M = 48.00%) more frequently than they selected the correct substitute toy (M 
= 37.4 %).   However, contrary to predictions, there were no significant main effects of 
demonstration or request condition.  Thus, direct or indirect motor perceptual input appeared to 
have no main effect on children’s performance.   
However, there was a marginally significant interaction between demonstration and 
request condition, F (1, 96) = 3.07, p=.08 (see figure 7) suggesting that direct and indirect motor 
perceptual input could play a role if used in combination.     
 
20
30
40
50
60
Object Action
Observation
Demonstration
Imitation
Demonstration
Request 
Figure 7. Interaction between demonstration and request conditions on percentage correct 
toy choice 
 
This small interaction was driven primarily by the fact that percentage correct toy choice 
was higher if children in the imitation condition also received an action request (50.3%) vs. an 
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object request (40.3%), respectively, t (46) = -1.75, p < .09).  If children were in the imitation 
demonstration condition, they did much better with an action request than an object request.  In 
contrast, for children in the observation demonstration condition it did not matter whether the 
request was presented with an object (M=40.3%) or an action M=37.8%, t (46) = ,73, p = ns.  
Furthermore, percentage correct toy choice was also significantly higher for children in the 
action request condition who received an imitation demonstration vs. an observation 
demonstration (mean difference = 12.50%, t (44) = -2.06, p<.05).  There were no interactions 
between demonstration and request condition, between toy type and demonstration condition, 
and no three-way interaction between age, demonstration and request condition.   
Thus, contrary to predictions there was no main effect for direct motor perceptual input 
(imitation) or indirect motor perceptual input (action request.  However, this is not to say that 
direct or indirect motor perceptual input had no effect at all on children’s performance.  Rather, it 
appeared that direct and indirect motor perceptual input worked best when combined.  Children’s 
performance overall was significantly better if they received a combination of direct (imitation) 
and indirect (action request) motor perceptual input regardless of age or toy type.    
Moreover, there was an unpredicted significant interaction between toy type and request 
condition, F (1, 96) = 11.69, p<.01; see figure 8).   
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Figure 8. Interaction between request condition and toy type on percentage correct toy 
choice 
With substitute toys, toddlers chose the correct toy more significantly frequently in the 
action request condition (M=44.80%) than the object request condition (M=30.10%), t (96) = -
3.00, p<.01.  However with replica toys the situation was reversed, toddlers chose the correct toy 
significantly more frequently in the object request condition (52.60%) than the action request 
condition (44.80%), however this mean difference was not statistically significant.   Moreover, in 
the object request condition children performed significantly better with replica rather than 
substitute toys (22.6% mean difference, t (46) = 5.38, p<.01) but in the action request condition it 
the difference between replica and substitute toys was almost equivalent (mean difference = 
1.50%, ns).  Thus, the action request condition (indirect motor perceptual support) boosted 
toddler’s percentage correct toy choice more when asked to understand pretense substitute rather 
than replica toys.  Furthermore, there was no difference between toddlers’ percentage correct toy 
choice with replica or substitute toy if they were given indirect motor perceptual support from 
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the action request condition.  However, in the object request condition, children appeared to 
perform better with replica rather than substitute objects.     
In summary, in keeping with our predictions, main effects were found for age and for toy 
type.  Overall, children selected the correct toy more frequently when they were older (28 
months) and if they were matching replica toys to their referents rather than substitute toys.  
However contrary to our predictions there were no main effects for demonstration or request 
conditions. On their own direct motor support from imitation and indirect motor support from an 
action request, did not produce a higher percentage correct toy choice.   
However, the roles of direct and indirect motor perceptual support appeared to be 
moderated by request condition and toy type respectively.   Children did perform better with 
direct motor perceptual support (imitation demonstration) if imitation was paired with indirect 
motor perceptual input (an action).  And children did perform better with indirect motor 
perceptual support (action request) but only with substitute objects.   In contrast, an action 
request with replica objects seemed to reduce children’s percentage correct toy choice and 
children found it easier to match replica objects to a referent object rather to a pantomimed 
action.    
Moreover, although age was expected to interact with direct and indirect motor 
perceptual input, there was no evidence that 28 month olds, other than generally being better on 
the task, there was no evidence to suggest that they were performing any differently in the 
combination of demonstration and request conditions than 20 month olds.   
In summary, there were main effects of age and toy type, with children performing 
overall better if they were older and if the task used replica objects, but no main effects for direct 
or indirect motor input.  Furthermore, there was no evidence that 28 month olds were responding 
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differently to the direct and indirect motor perceptual input than 20 month olds.  However, 
children’s performance did benefit from direct motor perceptual input from imitation but only if 
combined with indirect motor perceptual input from an action request.  Moreover, children’s 
performance did benefit from indirect motor perceptual input from an action request but only for 
substitute objects.  In contrast, in general, children had more difficulty matching a replica toy to 
the correct action than to its referent object.   
3.3.2 Comparisons of percentage correct toy choice selection with chance at each age and 
within toy type and each condition pair.    
Although, ANOVA comparisons between demonstration and request conditions, age and 
toy type revealed the differences between conditions, they did not reveal in which conditions 
toddlers actually comprehended the task and performed above chance.   In order to know when 
children understood the task and when they did not, we needed to compare children’s 
performance in each condition with chance performance.   
Thus, one-sample t tests were conducted to compare children’s performance in each of 
the 4 demonstration-request condition combinations with chance at each age, 20 and 28 months. 
The dependent variable was the percentage correct toy choice for replica and substitute toys. 
Because four choices were available in every trial, percentage correct toy choice was compared 
with chance performance of 25.00%.      
Younger toddlers’ (20 months) mean percentage correct toy choice, are presented in table 
5 and in figure 9 with corresponding t-test statistics.     
 
 
 51 
 Table 5. Comparison of correct toy performance in each demonstration-request condition 
at 20 months. 
Toy Type Demonstration Condition 
Request 
Condition 
Correct Toy 
Percentage t df p 
Object 50.00 3.32 11 <.01 Observation Action 25.00 0 11 ns 
Object 48.08 2.48 10 <.05 Replica Toys Imitation Action 42.31 2.92 11 <.05 
Object 25.00 0 11 ns Observation Action 37.50 1.63 11 ns 
Object 26.92 .56 10 ns Substitute Toys Imitation Action 42.00 2.92 11 <.05 
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Figure 9. Percentage of correct toy choice by toy type, demonstration condition and request 
condition at 20 months of age (p<.05) 
 
Older toddlers’ (28 months) mean percentage correct toy choice, with corresponding t-
test statistics for each combination of demonstration and request conditions and with each toy 
type are presented in table 6 and in figure 10.     
Observation
Demonstration
Observation
Demonstration
Imitation      
Demonstration
Imitation    
Demonstration
Replica 
Request 
* * 
* * 
 52 
  
Table 6. Comparison of correct toy performance in each demonstration-request condition 
at 28 months. 
Toy Type Demonstration Condition 
Request 
Condition 
Correct Toy 
Percentage t df p 
Object 57.69 3.98 12 <.01 Observation Action 47.73 3.98 11 <.05 
Object 54.17 2.88  10 <.05 Replica Toys Imitation Action 59.09 4.89 10 <.01 
Object 36.54 1.56 12 ns Observation Action 40.91 1.88 11 <.09 
Object 31.25 .76 10 ns Substitute Toys Imitation Action 61.36 5.16 10 <.01 
 
 
Figure 10. Percentage of correct toy choice by toy type, demonstration condition and 
request condition at 28 months of age  (*, p<.05; +, p<.10) 
Younger (20 months) and older toddlers (28 months) were expected to perform above 
chance in more conditions with the replica than the substitute toys because of the assistance from 
visual perceptual input.  Consistent with our hypotheses, 20 month olds performed above chance 
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in 3 out of the 4 demonstration-request conditions in the replica toys but only 1 of 4 
demonstration-request conditions in the substitute toys.   
Older toddlers (28 months) performed above chance in all 4 demonstration-request 
conditions with the replica toys but in only 1 of 4 demonstration-request conditions with the 
substitute toys (with one demonstration-request condition approaching significance). 
Complementing the ANOVA findings of a main effect for toy type, replica toys were chosen 
above chance performance in more conditions than were substitute toys.  
Furthermore, older toddlers (28 months) were expected to perform above chance in more 
conditions than the younger toddlers (20 months) did.  Consistent with our hypotheses, 28 month 
olds performed above chance in 5 out of the 8 demonstration-request conditions (with an 
additional 6th approaching significance) while 20 month olds performed above chance in 4 of 8 
demonstration-request conditions.   Complementing the ANOVA findings of a main effect for 
age, 28 month olds chose the correct toy above chance in more conditions than 20 month olds 
did. 
Younger toddlers (20 months) were expected to select the correct replica and substitute 
toys above chance performance when they had a combination of an imitation demonstration 
(direct motor input) with an action request (indirect motor input).  Expectations were not met for 
the replica toys.   Indeed, 20 month old toddlers were able to select the correct replica toy above 
chance levels when an imitation demonstration (direct motor input) was combined with an action 
request (indirect motor input).    However, they were also able to choose the replica toy above 
chance even in the object request conditions (with no direct or indirect motor input).  
But, with the substitute toys, our expectations were met.  Younger toddlers (20 months) 
only performed above chance with substitute toys if the imitation demonstration (direct motor 
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input) was combined with an action request (indirect motor input).  They did not perform above 
chance in any other combination of demonstration and request complementing the ANOVA 
findings.   
Older toddlers (28 months) were expected to select the correct toy if they participated in 
either an imitation demonstration (direct motor input) or an action request (indirect motor 
perceptual input).   Unlike 20 month olds, they were not expected to need a combination of the 
two.  Once again, expectations were not met for the replica toys.   Older toddlers (28 months) 
were able to select the correct replica toy at above chance levels in any combination of 
demonstration and request conditions and thus, without any motor input.    But, expectations 
were partially met for the substitute toys.   Like younger toddlers, older toddlers only performed 
above chance with substitute toys in the imitation demonstration (direct motor input) combined 
with an action request (indirect motor input).   But, being in the imitation condition (direct motor 
input) did nothing to boost their performance when paired with an object request (no indirect 
motor input).  However, they were marginally significantly above chance when the reverse was 
true.    Thus, with substitute toys, they appeared almost capable being able to select the correct 
substitute toy with only indirect motor perceptual input in the action request condition.  .   
In summary, percentage of correct toy performance was above chance in more conditions 
with the replica toys than with substitute toys at each age.  Older toddlers (28 month olds) 
performed above chance in more conditions than younger toddlers (20 month olds).  Overall, 20 
and 28 month old toddlers did well with the replica toys in all conditions with the exception of 
the observation demonstration combined with an action request at 20 months of age.   With 
substitute toys, both 20 and 28 month olds chose the correct toy only when an imitation 
demonstration and action request were combined.    
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3.3.3 Imitation variables 
Relations between percent correct toy choice and imitation were assessed using inter-
correlations between percentage of correct toy choice for replica and substitute toys and 
imitation frequency, imitation fidelity and the percentage of toys imitated.  We had expected that 
when children engaged in more frequent, more faithful imitation with a greater percentage of 
toys, they would select the correct toy more often. The imitation variables were highly 
significantly related to each other (see Tables 7 and 8 for inter-correlations for replica toys and 
substitute toys respectively).  However, there were no significant relations between imitation 
frequency, imitation fidelity, percentage of toys imitated and percent correct toy choice.   
Table 7. Replica toys: Inter-correlations between percent correct toy choice and imitation 
variables (N=97) 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Percent Correct Toy Choice …    
2. Imitation Frequency .06 …   
3. Average Imitation Fidelity .05 .93*** …  
4. Percentage of Toys Imitated .04 .95*** .98*** … 
***, p<.001 
Table 8. Substitute toys: Inter-correlations between percent correct toy choice and 
imitation variables (N=97) 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Percent Correct Toy Choice …    
2. Imitation Frequency .10 …   
3. Average Imitation Fidelity .14 .92*** …  
4. Percentage of Toys Imitated .09 .94*** .98*** … 
***, p<.001 
This may have been due to a ceiling effect for imitation.   In general, the manipulation of 
action in the demonstration conditions was quite successful (please see Tables 3 and 4). Toddlers 
imitated in the imitation condition but not in the observation condition.    However, it may have 
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not produced enough variability in the imitation variables to establish a true relationship between 
imitation frequency, fidelity and percentage imitated with the percentage correct toy choice that 
might be existent in naturally occurring play interactions.  Introducing a 0-5 scale of imitation 
fidelity rather than the 0-3 scale used also could have produced more variability in the imitation 
scores but would have created a greater challenge for coding reliability.    
In summary, imitation variables were unrelated to toddlers’ performance on the task.   
3.3.4 Associative Learning: Object and Action 
One of the downsides of the paradigm used was that toddlers’ performance in the action 
request condition could be due to a lower-level mechanism of simple toy-action matching rather 
than the involvement of any pretense re-presentation.  To address this problem, a control toy set 
was introduced to measure toddlers’ capacity to create a simple association between toy and 
action.   Thus, this control toy set was only used in the action request condition.  Toddlers were 
not expected to match toy and action through simple association: ie, they were not expected to 
perform above chance with the control toys.   
T-tests were conducted to compare children’s performance on the control toys to chance.  
The dependent variable was the percentage correct toy choice for control toys.   Because four 
choices were available in every trial, the percentage correct toy choice selected was compared 
with chance performance of 25.00%.   Surprisingly, toddlers were able to match the control toys 
to actions, M=48.90%, t (45) = 3.31, p<.05.  This was an unexpected finding.   
Because we had previously a found main effect of age on toddler’s ability to match 
replica and substitute toys with action requests, follow-up analyses examined 20 and 28 month 
olds’ ability to choose the correct control toys separately.   T-tests were conducted first to 
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compare younger toddlers’ (20 months) percent correct control toy choice with chance and then 
older toddlers’ (28 months) percent correct control toy choice with chance. 
Younger toddlers (20 months) were not able to select the control toys at above chance 
levels suggesting that their performance with replica and substitute toys in the action request 
condition was not due to simple associative learning (M = 36.84% correct, t (23) =4.22, p < .01).  
However, older toddlers (28 months) were able to select the control toys at above chance levels 
(M = 50.00 % correct, t (23) =4.22, p < .01) suggesting that they were capable of learning a 
simple association between object and action during the task.   
Could 28 month olds capacity for simple associative learning explain their ability to 
choose the correct replica and substitute toys in action request conditions?  Follow-up inter-
correlations assessed whether 28 month olds’ ability to match toys and actions was related to 
their performance with replica toys and substitute toys.  Older toddlers’ (28 months) correct 
control toy percentage predicted their correct toy choice percentage with replica, r (22) =.72, 
p<.001, but not substitute toys, r (22) =.28, p=.22.   
In response to this unexpected finding, additional follow-up analyses were run to 
examine the role of demonstration condition on all children’s percentage correct toy choice while 
controlling for the capability to match control objects with actions.  Because, the control toys 
were administered to only children in the action request condition and not to children in the 
object request condition, I was only able to control for associative learning in the subgroup of 
children who received an action request.    
A 2 (demonstration condition: imitation vs. observation) x 2 (toy type: replica vs. 
substitute toy) x 2 (age) mixed ANCOVA with percentage correct toy choice as the dependent 
factor  and percentage correct choice on control toys as the covariate  was conducted to test for 
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overall main effects and interactions.   There was a main effect of demonstration condition F (1, 
46) = 11.02, p<.01, when percentage correct toy choice for control toys was controlled such that 
children in the imitation condition had a significantly higher correct toy percentage.    
Specifically, when associative learning is controlled for children who experienced direct motor 
perceptual input showed approximately 20% better percentage correct toy performance (62.80%) 
in matching toys to actions than did children in the observation condition (41.80%), 
F(1,20)=11.20, p<.01. 
   In other words, if associative learning is controlled for, there is a main effect of direct 
motor perceptual input (imitation demonstration condition) but only among children who also 
later receive indirect motor perceptual input (the action request condition).  In contrast to 
previous analyses, which found no main effect for imitation, restricting the sample to children 
who only participated in the action request condition and controlling for children’s facility with 
associative learning, showed that direct motor perceptual input can have an effect on children’s 
pretend play comprehension.    
In summary, we unexpectedly found that 28-month-old but not 20-month-old toddlers 
were capable of learning a simple association between toy and action during the course of the 
task.  Furthermore, the capacity to learn this simple association predicted 28 month olds ability 
to correctly match a replica toy but not a substitute toy to its referent action.  However, when 
simple association was controlled for, there is a main effect of direct motor perceptual input on 
all children’s correct toy performance within the action request condition.  This partially supports 
the hypothesis that direct motor perceptual input can help facilitate children’s understanding of 
pretense.   
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3.3.5 Toddlers’ Errors 
In examining the possibility of associative learning between object and action, another 
associative learning possibility was discovered.  In particular, because all of the pretend actions 
were being performed to the body, children may have learned a simple association between the 
toy and the body part.   This association would be most problematic for the action request 
condition of the task.  Viewed from the body location perspective, the experimenter could be 
demonstrating the pretense action with the replica or substitute toy to a location on the body, and 
then be in essence “pointing” to this body part when demonstrating the pantomimed action 
request.  For example, when the experimenter requested a brush by pantomiming brushing her 
hair, the child may have chosen either a brush or a hat simply because they had learned that the 
toy and the head go together.  This was of particular significance for the replica toys.  Two of the 
toys were associated with actions to the head (brush and hat) and two were associated with 
actions to the mouth (phone and bottle).    However, this association was less of a consideration 
for the substitute toys, only the stick/toothbrush and ball/apple were both associated with actions 
to the mouth.  The block and ball toys were directed towards very different body parts.   
This possibility was not planned for and controlled for methodologically but was 
examined statistically.  Fortunately, the object request condition offered a convenient control to 
examine the possibility of associative learning between toy and body part.   In the object request 
condition, toys were requested with an object and no body part was “pointed” to with an action.  
Therefore, we could examine whether the pattern of errors between these two conditions differed 
and thus, whether children were merely associating body part with the toy when making their 
choice.  To that end a confusion matrix was created which articulated the types of errors children 
are making with each toy set (see Tables 9 and 10). 
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Table 9. Replica toy confusion matrices.  Frequency with which each replica toy was 
selected following a specific request, for both request conditions, (N=96) , for object request 
only (N=48)and for action request only (N=48). 
 
Both Request Conditions 
 Selected Toy 
Requested Toy No Toy Bottle Hat Phone Brush 
Bottle 6.52% 53.26% 7.61% 17.39% 15.22% 
Hat 14.44% 15.56% 34.44% 14.44% 21.11% 
Phone 7.61% 17.39% 9.78% 41.30% 23.91% 
Brush 8.70% 13.04% 13.04% 13.04% 52.17% 
 
Object Request Condition 
 Selected Toy 
Requested Toy No Toy Bottle Hat Phone Brush 
Bottle 4.17% 66.67% 6.25% 10.42% 12.50% 
Hat 19.57% 10.87% 41.30% 10.87% 17.39% 
Phone 12.50% 12.50% 6.25% 47.92% 20.83% 
Brush 12.50% 18.75% 8.33% 6.25% 54.17% 
 
Action Request Condition 
 Selected Toy 
Requested Toy No Toy Bottle Hat Phone Brush 
Bottle 9.09% 38.64% 9.09% 25.00% 18.18% 
Hat 9.09% 20.45% 27.27% 18.18% 25.00% 
Phone 2.27% 22.73% 13.64% 34.09% 27.27% 
Brush 4.55% 6.82% 18.18% 20.45% 50.00% 
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 Table 10. Substitute toy confusion matrices.  Frequency with which each replica toy was 
selected following a specific request, for both request conditions, (N=96) , for object request 
only (N=48)and for action request only (N=48). 
All Request Conditions 
 Selected Toy 
Requested Toy No Toy Stick Block Ball Box 
Stick 8.70% 45.65% 7.61% 34.78% 3.26% 
Block 16.30% 16.30% 35.87% 30.43% 1.09% 
Ball 10.99% 17.58% 8.79% 59.34% 3.30% 
Box 16.67% 21.11% 16.67% 34.44% 11.11% 
 
Object Request Condition 
 Selected Toy 
Requested Toy No Toy Stick Block Ball Box 
Stick 12.50% 39.58% 6.25% 37.50% 4.17% 
Block 25.00% 20.83% 25.00% 29.17% 0.00% 
Ball 18.75% 20.83% 6.25% 54.17% 0.00% 
Box 23.40% 21.28% 21.28% 27.66% 6.38% 
 
Action Request Condition 
 Selected Toy 
Requested Toy No Toy Stick Block Ball Box 
Stick 4.55% 52.27% 9.09% 31.82% 2.27% 
Block 6.82% 11.36% 47.73% 31.82% 2.27% 
Ball 2.33% 13.95% 11.63% 65.12% 6.98% 
Box 9.30% 20.93% 11.63% 41.86% 16.28% 
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General log linear analyses were run to examine the patterns between the requested and 
selected toy and to evaluate whether demonstration or request condition predicted the types of 
errors children were likely to make.   The general log linear analysis procedure could therefore 
analyzes the frequency counts of correct selection and errors in a contingency table and identifies 
which frequencies occur beyond expectations across toys. This procedure was first run for 
replica toys and then repeated for substitute and control toys.   Chi-squares for comparisons 
between object and action request errors are presented in table 11.   
 
Table 11. X2s for Object vs. Action Request Comparisons for Toy Errors 
  Object Vs. Action Comparisons 
  Toy Selected 
Replica Objects Bottle Hat Phone Brush 
 Bottle --- 0.32 3.22 0.63 
 Hat .87 --- 0.48 0.27 
 Phone 0.92 0.97 --- 0.14 
 Brush 3.14 1.36 3.14 --- 
      
Substitute Objects     
  Stick Block Ball Box 
 Stick --- 0.14 0.50 0.34 
 Block 2.25 --- .07 .01 
 Ball 1.33 .37 --- 0.01 
 Box 1.97 0.68 0.57 --- 
 
For replica errors there was no evidence that children were choosing on the basis of 
location when they were asked for the bottle, brush, hat, and phone toys.    In general, there were 
no significant differences between the frequency of errors for each replica toy distracter when 
comparing object and action request conditions (see table 11).  Furthermore, within each request 
condition for each toy, bottle, brush, hat and phone, there were no significant differences in the 
frequency of errors in selecting one of the other distracter toys.    
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For substitute toys, there was also no evidence that children were choosing on the basis of 
location when they were asked for the stick, block, ball and box.   In general, there were no 
significant differences between the frequency of errors for each substitute toy distracter when 
comparing object and action request conditions (see table 11).   However, analyses demonstrated 
that when certain substitute toys were requested through an object or action request, the 
likelihood that children would choose one of the 3 distracter toys was not equal.  In particular, as 
seen in table 10, children were most significantly more likely to pick the stick or the ball in error 
and were highly unlikely to select the block in error.  However, this pattern did not demonstrate a 
preference for the toy which matched the same body part but rather, children’s overall preference 
for the stick and ball distracters and disregard for the box distracter regardless which toy was 
requested.      
In summary, while children could have used the strategy of matching the toy to location 
in order to decipher the experimenter’s pantomimed action request, the data overall do not 
support such a conclusion.  Therefore, although this possibility of location matching was not 
controlled for methodologically, it was unlikely to have played a large role on children’s toy 
selection.   
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4.0  DISCUSSION 
The overarching goal of the current paper was to examine whether children’s actions with toys 
and corresponding motor perceptual input could support their pretense representations.   One of 
the primary hypotheses was that direct motor perceptual input from imitating pretense actions 
and indirect motor perceptual input from an action request would facilitate toddlers’ pretense re-
presentations and thus, their ability to match pretend toys to referent objects and actions.  In 
particular, I expected motor perceptual input to have a direct and main effect on children’s 
correct toy choice and thus, their pretense re-presentation, regardless of age, or pretend toy.   
4.1 MAIN EFFECTS 
My expectations were partially met.  The results of the current study demonstrate that, on their 
own, direct and indirect motor perceptual input do not have a main effect on children’s pretense 
representation at 20 and 28 months of age.  Simply imitating an action or watching an adult 
pantomime an action is not enough by itself to boost children’s pretend play representation and 
subsequent comprehension with all toys.   However, interestingly, direct and indirect motor 
perception can help support pretense representation under the right circumstances (to be 
described further).   
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However, there were main effects for both age and toy type.  In general, older toddlers 
(28 months) performed better on the task more often than younger toddlers (20 months).   I had 
hypothesized that as toddlers’ pretense re-presentations become more robust with age they would 
be less reliant on direct motor perceptual input but would still need indirect motor input to 
engage in pretense re-presentation but there was no statistical evidence to support this 
interaction.  Furthermore, in general, confirming our expectations and supporting the process of 
“de-contextualization” described in the descriptive literature on pretend play development 
(Belsky & Most, 1981; Elder& Pederson, 1978; Fenson, 1984; Fenson & Ramsey, 1980; 
Jackowitz & Watson, 1980; Piaget ,1965;  Ungerer et al., 1981), toddlers matched replica toys 
correctly to referents more than they matched substitute toys to referents. 
4.2 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DIRECT AND INDIRECT MOTOR 
PERCEPTUAL INPUT  
Although there was no main effect for imitation, direct motor perceptual input (imitation) did 
affect children’s performance but this effect was moderated by request type.  Only if imitation 
was paired with an action request did children demonstrate modestly improved performance on 
the task.  In fact, overall, of the four demonstration-request condition pairs, children showed the 
best percentage correct toy choice when imitation and action where paired together.   Thus, 
direct motor input from imitation and indirect motor input from observing another’s action 
appear to work synergistically to bootstrap children’s understanding of pretend play.     
Moreover, if children’s capacity for associative learning is controlled for statistically, this modest 
effect appears even more robust.   Thus, the direct motor perceptual input of imitation does 
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appear have a significant effect on children’s performance on the task, above and beyond any 
capacity for associative learning.  However this effect is only present if direct motor input is also 
matched with indirect motor perceptual input.  Twenty and 28 month old toddlers pretend re-
presentations are facilitated by motor perceptual input but only when there is a combination of 
both direct and indirect motor perceptual input.   
In order to illustrate this finding, let’s return to the example of pretending a toy is a car 
used in the initial exposition of embodied pretend play cognition.   In general, opportunities to 
move with the toy will only assist toddlers’ representation of the absent car when they also have 
subsequent opportunity to watch another person’s car-like movement with the toy.   Thus, the 
combination of direct motor perceptual input from imitation of a lateral back and forth activity 
and watching other person’s car-like actions boosts their ability to engage in pretense re-
presentation of the absent referent objects.    The importance of direct motor perceptual input 
depends on children’s additional opportunities to watch others engage in pretense action.  This 
finding highlights the need for early pretend play to be grounded within a social context.   
4.3 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DIRECT AND INDIRECT PERCEPTUAL INPUT 
AND TOY TYPE 
Indirect motor perceptual input (action request), on the other hand, was moderated by toy type, 
replica or substitute toys.    Only if action requests were used with substitute objects did children 
demonstrate improved performance on the pretend play task.  Furthermore, children’s 
performance with both replica and substitute objects was equivalent if an action request was 
used.  However, overall, children demonstrated the best performance when asked to match 
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replicas to their referent objects.   When visual perceptual input was rich, as when replica objects 
and their referents were in the same visual field, visual perceptual input provided the best support 
for children’s pretend re-presentations.  However, if visual input from the toy was slightly 
diminished, substitute objects, toddlers did best if they also had the additional support of indirect 
motor perceptual input.    So to return to the car example, matching a replica car to its referent 
does not require indirect motor perceptual input from watching another’s action.  But if young 
toddlers watch an adult engage in a pretend action of object substitution in which the adult 
pretends a block is a toy car, toddlers are likely to need to see the action again and re-experience 
the indirect motor perceptual support in order to re-present the toy car.    
In addition, although a three way interaction between direct motor perceptual input, 
indirect motor perceptual type and toy type was not statistically significant when comparing 
within and across groups, complementary analyses comparing children’s performance with 
chance performance revealed that the interaction between direct and indirect motor perceptual 
support (described earlier) was also primarily driven by children’s performance with substitute 
toys.  Direct motor perceptual from imitation did very little to boost toddlers’ understanding of 
pretense with replica toys because they were already quite good at matching replica toys.     
Although we did not expect that motor perceptual input would have no effect on 
children’s comprehension of pretense with replica toys, we did predict that motor perceptual 
input would be more important for children’s pretend play with substitute toys.  It appears that 
this was the case.  When visual perceptual support is rich, as is the case with toddlers’ pretending 
with replica objects, toddlers do not need motor perceptual input to engage in pretense re-
presentation and comprehend pretend play.  However, when toys are visually dissimilar from 
their referents, such as with substitute toys, toddlers are much more reliant on the combination of 
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direct and indirect motor perceptual input to support their comprehension of pretense.  In 
particular, toddlers at both ages only performed above chance with the substitute toys if they had 
a combination of imitation (direct motor perceptual input) and an action request (indirect motor 
perceptual input).   
Although we had expected that the frequency and fidelity of imitation would predict how 
toddlers performed on the task, this did not prove true.  This may reflect a lack of variation in the 
frequency quality of children’s imitation or it may be that simply approximating the action once 
or twice in a semi-faithful way is enough direct motor perceptual input.   It would be interesting 
to know whether variability in children’s imitation frequency and quality in naturally occurring 
play contexts could predict children’s comprehension of the task but the demands of the current 
task did not allow for much variability on either measure.   
Finally, I expected that toddlers’ performance on this task could not be explained purely 
by their ability to learn a simple association between object and action but that children would 
need to engage in pretense representation in order to comprehend the paradigm.  This was true 
for 20-month-old toddlers.  They were unable to perform above chance levels with the control 
toys.  However, I was surprised when by 28 months toddlers could match novel control toys to 
the experimenter’s pantomimed actions, even though they had only seen the toy-action pair for 
the first time during the demonstration phase of the task.   
However, 28 month olds correct performance on this simple association task with novel 
toys was related to their ability to match replica but not substitute toys to actions.  Although, 28 
month olds’ ability to make a simple association between toy and action may account for why 
they were able to match replica toys to actions, it does not account for their ability to match 
substitute toys to others’ actions suggesting that children’s apparent understanding of object 
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substitution pretense at this age is not accounted for by learning a simple association between toy 
and action.  Furthermore, the other associative learning possibility that children are not engaging 
in pretense re-presentation but simply matching the object to the appropriate body part was also 
examined by examining children’s errors to look for systematic patterns.  There was no evidence 
to support the body part matching hypothesis.  
To summarize, direct motor input from imitation did support toddlers’ pretense 
representation in certain contexts.  In particular, imitation supported children’s understanding of 
pretense when children played with substitute toys and when they were asked to match toys to 
actions.  At 20 and 28 months, motor perceptual input rather than being purely a consequence of 
pretend representation can help guide pretense re-presentations when children play with 
substitute toys that are de-contextualized from their referents.  When children play with 
substitute toys and both direct and indirect motor perceptual input is absent, they appear to have 
more difficulty engaging in pretend play re-presentation and thus, are not able to match 
substitute toys to their referent objects.   
In contrast, toddlers’ understanding of pretense with replica objects at this age is largely 
independent of motor perceptual input.   It may be that the rich visual input children receive from 
replica toys and the physical resemblance of replica toys to their referents outweighs the need for 
motor perceptual input.  It may also be that toddlers have a lot of motor practice pretending with 
replica toys and do not benefit from the motor input generated during this task.  In general, 
toddlers able to match replica toys to both objects and actions and with replica toys, and thus, 
show pretense re-presentation with no motor input with replica objects.   
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4.4 LIMITATIONS 
Although results of the current study do provide some support for a perceptual simulation 
account of pretense re-presentation they do not allow us to directly test this proposal.  It may be 
that some other cognitive process, other than perceptual simulation could explain the pattern of 
results found in the current study and that motor and visual simulation are not involved at all.  
However, at this point in developmental social neuroscience, we do not have the methodology to 
directly test whether the motor and visual perceptual systems associated with performing 
pretense action are engaged when observing another’s pretend play action.   Because of 
movement artifacts found in fMRI and PET studies, measuring toddlers’ brain activity in 
response to watching pretense actions would be next to impossible (Johnson, 2000).  
Furthermore, ERP data, while interesting, could only give us unlocalized data on the neural 
activity found in pretend play engagement (Carver & Bauer, 2004).   
4.5 EMOBIDIED PRETEND PLAY IN EMPIRICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 
Despite our inability to test of possible perceptual simulation directly such as could be found 
through neuroscience methods, the current findings do point to a complex interrelationship 
between both motor and visual elements for pretend play development.  Furthermore, re-
conceptualizing pretense representation as perceptual simulation provides a new lens by which to 
view at the dynamic system of perceptual input that children need in order to engage in pretend-
representation at any point in time, both within a single play session and across early 
development.  The results from the current study demonstrate that children’s pretense is not 
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simply affected by one single perceptual factor but that both motoric and visual perceptual input 
can work in synergy or antagonistically depending on the toy and social context.   
In addition, the sometimes perplexing findings that children demonstrate across tasks of 
pretense comprehension also reflect the complexity of the interdynamic system of pretend play 
representation.   Thus, the variation seen in toddlers’ comprehension of pretense across 
paradigms is not just noise nor is it due to methodological inadequacy (Harris & Kavanaugh, 
1993; Leslie, 1987; Lillard, 2001; Nichols & Stich, 2000; Perner, 1991; Tomasello, Striano & 
Rochat, 1999, Watson & Fisher, 1977) but truly represents young toddlers’ dependence on both 
motor and visual perceptual input to engage in pretense re-presentation or perceptual simulation.  
Toddlers do not just “have” the capacity for pretend play representation, their emergent 
understanding of pretense is jointly constructed with their physical and social environment.   
Moreover, the current results also converge with empirical reports the increasing visual 
decontextualization of toddlers’ pretense with objects (Belsky & Most, 1981; Elder& Pederson, 
1978; Fenson, 1984; Fenson & Ramsey, 1980; Jackowitz & Watson, 1980; Piaget ,1965;  
Ungerer et al., 1981).   
Perhaps the best way to explain the current findings is to apply them in context.  Imagine 
a group of toddlers, 20 and 28 months of age, playing pretend with a parent, babysitter or 
teacher.  Toys both visually similar to their referents such a replica baby’s bottle, brush, hat and 
toy phone receiver, and others not so defined such as a block, stick, ball and box  are scattered 
around the rug on floor.   What happens if an adult makes a bid for children to play pretend with 
her with these toys? When do they understand her goals, her intentions?  When do they have the 
capacity for pretend re-presentation?   
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Unlike current theory and research on pretend play, which assume that toddlers’ pretense 
capacity for pretend re-presentation and comprehension develops at one age and should apply 
equally well to all toys and environmental contexts (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Leslie, 1987; 
Lillard, 2001; Nichols & Stich, 2000; Perner, 1991), embodied pretend play theory predicts that 
toddlers’ ability to demonstrate pretense representation depends on the opportunities for 
perceptual input present in the physical and social environment.  The current study provides 
systematic support for this theory by demonstrating that toddlers’ capacity for pretend play 
comprehension depends not just on the age of the child but also on what adult partners do with 
the toys, how they make bids for pretend play engagement, which toy is used, and what the child 
does with the toy.   
By re-conceptualizing pretend play representation as re-presentation or simulation of 
perceptual information, we can begin to explain toddlers’ performance on different pretend play 
comprehension task varies.   In particular, in keeping with other findings in the pretense 
literature, the current study suggests that children begin to be able to understand pretend play 
around 18-22 months with increased levels of motor and visual perceptual support (Watson & 
Fisher, 1977; Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006) and their capacity for pretense representation 
becomes robust and less dependent on perceptual input by the time children are 26-29 months of 
age (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006; Walker-Andrews and Kahana-
Kalman, 1999).  Although the current study has begun to explain when and which combination 
of visual and motor perceptual input either facilitates or decreases children’s pretend play 
comprehension, further research is necessary to fully articulate which perceptual and social 
elements are necessary and sufficient.   
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However, the current study does highlight the under-examined role that motor perceptual 
input plays for children’s pretend play performance.  Although, Piaget originally articulated a 
possible motor component of initial pretend play competence (Piaget, 1945), this element of 
pretend play has almost never been experimentally manipulated (Tomasello et al., 1999).  The 
current study is the first to manipulate the role of direct motor perceptual input or imitation on 
children’s pretend play performance.  From the current results, motor perceptual inputs both 
direct and indirect, played a modest role in children’s understanding of the pretend play task.  
Furthermore, motor perceptual input in this age group, did little to support children’s pretend 
play with replica objects.  However, when direct motor perceptual input from imitation was 
combined with indirect motor perceptual input both served to bootstrap children’s performance, 
especially with substitute objects.  This suggests that children’s imitation of acts of object 
substitution at 20-28 months are not just blind mimicry but instead reflect toddlers’ developing 
capacity for object substitution pretense when motor input is present.   
4.6 COMMON CODING AND THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
Furthermore, the description of indirect motor perceptual support as a visual cue to activate their 
own internal motor simulation of another’s action (indirect motor input), has much in common 
with emerging common coding theories (Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006; 
Metzoff & Decety, 2003.).   The current results may also inform our understanding of how 
common coding develops. 
There is growing empirical evidence that when adults observe others’ actions, they 
simultaneously simulate others’ actions internally (common coding theory, Prinz, 2002; 
 74 
Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006) and that this ability may be driven by mirror neurons (Meltzoff & 
Decety, 2003; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese & Fogassi, 1996).  Furthermore, beyond a simple 
motor resonance, common coding is thought to support understanding of the goals of others’ 
actions (Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006; Metzoff & Decety, 2003) and 
assist adults in predicting the outcomes of others’ actions (Kilner et al., 2004 Sebanz, Bekkering, 
& Knoblich, 2006; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005;).     
However, the developmental story for common coding is relatively uncharted 
empirically.  Some have suggested that neonatal imitation represents an innate motor resonance 
between newborns’ and others’ actions (Longo & Bertenthal, 2004; Meltzoff & Decety, 2003) 
and that imitative action is enacted common coding (Metzoff & Decety, 2003).   Moreover, other 
researchers have demonstrated empirically that an observation/execution matching system is in 
place at least by 9-12 months of age (Longo & Bertenthal, 2006; Somerville & Woodward, 
2005).   By 9 months of age, action perception influences infants’ action production (Longo & 
Bertenthal, 2006) and by 10-12 months of age, infants’ action production influences their action 
perception (Somerville & Woodward, 2005).   
The current study also provides some additional developmental support for common 
coding proposals.  Specifically, it may be that the indirect motor perceptual input hypothesized to 
result from watching another’s action is really the result of motor resonance or common coding 
between one’s own and another’s action.  Thus, in observation demonstration and the action 
request condition, toddlers may have simulated the experimenter’s action with pretend objects.    
This common coding appears to have helped them understand the goal of the 
experimenter’s actions with replica toys.  In general, they were able to match toys to referents 
without performing the action themselves suggesting that simply watching the experimenter’s 
 75 
actions was enough for them to understand the goal of her behavior.  However, with substitute 
toys, common coding alone wasn’t enough to permit them to understand the goal of the 
experimenter’s action.  Complementing Somerville & Woodward (2005) finding, toddlers’ 
action production facilitated their action understanding.   Toddlers understood the experimenter’s 
goal best when they physically produced the action.  Thus, common coding with substitute toys 
needed to be enacted rather than simply simulated.    Furthermore, adult neuroscience studies of 
the mirror system have shown that common coding is more strongly activated for adults when 
watching actions that they have previously performed (Repp & Knoblich, 2005) and are expert in 
(Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham & Haggard, 2005).  It may be that until toddlers 
gather expertise with pretend play acts of object substitution, they need to produce the action in 
order to perceive the goal of others’ pretend play acts with substitute toys.   
Thus, the current study provides some complementary evidence that a common coding or 
observation/execution matching system is in place with pretend play actions in early childhood.  
Moreover, it also demonstrates that toddlers’ expertise with pretend play actions and their 
production of the action affect their comprehension of pretense.   
4.7 COMPARING THE “WORMY” AND “CHUTE” TASKS 
The current findings also replicate and extend many of the findings in the original Tomasello et 
al. (1999) paradigm.   In both studies toddlers also did better at matching replica toys to their 
referents than matching substitute toys to their referents.   
However, there was also one striking difference between children’s performance on the 
“chute” and “Wormy.” tasks.  In the original study, younger children were not able to match 
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replica toys to their referent objects (e.g. match a replica brush to a large brush) but were able to 
match replica toys to actions (e.g. match a replica brush to the experimenter pantomiming 
brushing her hair.).  In the current study, 20 month olds performance was reversed; they could 
match a toy brush to a real brush but not a pantomimed action.     
It is hard to know how to explain this discrepancy between the studies.  One possible 
explanation is that the ratio between the size of the replica toys and their referents played a role.   
The replica toys used in the current study were not quite as small as the original study and 
perhaps having a lower object to replica ratio facilitated younger toddlers’ ability to match 
replica toy to its referent and see the similarity between them.  Another possible explanation is 
that actions with toys in the current study were self-directed whereas in the original Tomasello et 
al. (1999) study the actions were directed both to the self and to objects.   Limiting all toys to self 
directed  actions may have been easier because of children’s history of  past motor experience 
Meanwhile, in both studies younger and older toddlers were incapable of matching 
substitute toys to their referents (ie. matching a stick previously used as a toothbrush to a real 
toothbrush).  Contrary to our predictions imitation had very little effect on children’s 
performance in the object request condition. What is so difficult about this task?     
It could be that matching substitute objects with referent objects requires more than just 
pretend re-presentation and that it also requires dual-representation (DeLoache, 2002; Tomasello 
et al., 1999).  Dual representation has been used explain children’s ability to translate spatial 
relations between scale models and full-size rooms (DeLoache, 2002).    In order to engage in 
dual representation when a toddler “brushes” his teeth with a stick, he has to first engage in the 
perceptual representation of the stick in his hand, second, represent  the imagined toothbrush in 
his mind and third, explicitly understand the relationship between them (DeLoache, 2002).  It 
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may be that pretend play only requires the first and second steps while performance on this 
matching task requires the third step of explicitly representing the relationship between toy and 
referent object.  Toddlers’ failure to select the correct substitute toy to match the referent object 
suggests that perhaps they are incapable of making this third step, creating an explicit symbolic 
link between the substitute toy and its referent.   
Another alternative explanation is that the current structure of the task worked against 
toddler’s abilities to match substitute toys to their referent objects.   Children may have 
understood the task better if the experimenter had requested each substitute toy by using the 
name associated with the referent object.  In the present study, the experimenter only asked 
toddlers for “this one” while holding up the referent object.  Perhaps merely showing children 
the toy rather than saying its name confused children and prevented them from seeing the 
relationship between toy and referent object.   
What if the experimenter had labeled the referent object instead?  For example, instead of 
just showing toddlers the toothbrush to ask for the substitute toy, the stick, what if the 
experimenter had asked toddlers for a “toothbrush”?  Research suggests that, given these 
conditions, toddlers at this age might have been able to select the correct toy (Smith, 2003).  
Smith and colleagues (2003) have found that by 19-22 months of age, toddlers are capable of 
selecting the correct substitute toy if given requesting the substitute toy with the verbal label 
associated with the referent.   In addition to visual and motor perceptual support, labeling objects 
may provide an additional layer of assistance for children’s pretend play representations.   
Why might this be?   Recent neuroscience research has given has shown that that adults’ 
linguistic representations are frequently embodied processes (for a review see Gibbs, 2003).   
This may also hold true for children’s linguistic comprehension.   It may be that when children 
 78 
hear a word, in order to understand it, they need to simulate the perceptual experience associated 
with the world which, in turn primes them to use that representation for pretense.   For example, 
to use the car example, if a toddler hears the word “car”, he needs to simulate the visual and 
motor perceptual input to understand the word.  This process of simulation, in turn primes him to 
turn any car-like object in his field of view into a substitute toy “car”.  Thus, manipulating 
language may be an additional puzzle piece in the social contextual system to support early 
pretend play representation.   
4.8  APPLYING EMBODIED PRETEND PLAY FINDINGS 
How can we apply current findings to naturally occurring play scenarios?    Let’s reconsider the 
pretend scenario described earlier: A group of toddlers, 20 and 28 months of age crowds around 
a caregiver on a floor scattered with replica toys and substitute toys such as a stick or block 
whose purpose is undefined and larger toys.  What recommendations could caregivers use to 
bootstrap children’s understanding of pretense?    Under what conditions can parents or teachers 
assume that toddlers understand pretend play? 
First, consistent with numerous studies which have suggested that early pretend play is 
primarily a social activity (for a review, see Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2006), caregivers’ 
actions with objects appear to be critical for toddlers’ emergent pretend play.   Thus, caregivers 
who want children to engage in pretense, should encourage pretense by modeling pretend play 
with both replica and substitute toys.   In general, caregivers should also ask toddlers to perform 
the actions themselves.  Children often do so willingly, and some even take the object out of the 
caregivers’ hand even before the pretend play action is finished.  However, even when children 
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don’t imitate pretend play actions spontaneously, encouraging them to do so will have a 
significant effect on their understanding of object substitution pretense. 
Pretend play explorations like these occur every day in childcare classrooms, at parks, 
and in homes around the country and the world.   Particularly in the United States there is a held 
belief that pretend play is not only fun and enjoyable for child and adult partners, but is also 
important for children’s thinking (Haight & Miller, 1993; Paley, 1986) and development (Smith, 
2002).  Non-profits are started (www.nifplay.org, www.allianceforchildhood.net) and manifestos 
are written (www.udel.edu/~roberta/play/) with the mission to protect the importance of play in 
childhood.  Childcare centers and preschools advertise their play-based curriculum (for an 
example, see www.coopchild.org).   Authors of popular child development manuals encourage 
parents to pretend with their toddlers and preschoolers (Eisenberg, Murkoff, & Hathaway, 1994).  
Toys are marketed with claims that they will “unleash children’s imaginations” (Play with a 
Purpose, www.pwaponline.com)   As a society, we have come to believe that child’s play is 
more than just child’s play but an important way for children to learn.2  Moreover the empirical 
literature on pretend play development has shown that children who engage in more frequent and 
complex pretend play show greater understanding in tasks of affective perspective taking, 
emotion understanding and “theory of mind” tasks such as false belief (Astington & Jenkins, 
1995; Dunn & Cutting, 1999; Howe Rinaldi, Jennings, & Petrakos, 2002; Hughes & Dunn, 1997; 
Taylor & Carlson, 1997).   
  Perhaps the beauty of pretend play is not only that it introduces children to a world of 
imagination, but that it also allows for and perhaps even drives children’s growing flexibility at 
decoupling and re-coupling of the links between motor and visual perception.  What happens 
                                                 
2 However, this emphasis on pretend play for children’s development is not found in all cultures.  For reviews see 
Haight (1999) and Gaskins (1999).    
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when the object you hold in your hand is different from the object you have pictured in your 
head?  How visually different do they have to be before it is too difficult to make a link between 
them?  Will moving with the object in your hand help you envision the other object in your 
head?   What if you watch someone else perform the movement associated with the object you’re 
trying to imagine?  Is that enough to help you imagine?  Pretending presents a multitude of 
combinations and permutations of the relationships between motor and visual perception and the 
work one must do to simulate one, either or both.  And best of all, despite or perhaps even 
because of all of this complex cognitive work, children and their adult partners enjoy 
participating in pretend play scenarios and tasks (Haight & Miller, 1993).   
4.9 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Although the findings of the current study provide partial support for an embodied re-
conceptualization of pretend play development, future research could also address unanswered 
questions from this current paradigm. 
Younger toddlers appear not to need motor perceptual input to understand pretend play 
with replica objects by 20 months of age.    However, motor perceptual input with replica objects 
might be more important for pretense re-presentation with replica objects when toddlers’ very 
first pretend play actions emerge.     If younger toddlers, 12-15 months of age could understand 
the demands of “feeding” Wormy, future research could address whether toddlers’ earliest 
pretend actions with replica objects also can be supported by motor input.    
Another goal of future research could be to examine further toddlers’ difficulty matching 
substitute toys to referent objects.   Earlier research by Tomasello et al. (1999) suggests that this 
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ability might not occur until 35 months of age.  As described earlier, verbal labels may help 
improve toddler’s ability to match substitute objects and referents.  This proposal needs to be 
tested empirically.     
Furthermore, the current task could also be manipulated to address the developmental 
processes of decentration (Brownell & Carriger, 1991; Fenson & Ramsay, 1980, Watson & 
Fisher, 1977.).  The direction of the pretend play actions was kept constant for the current 
paradigm: All actions were self-directed.  However, manipulating the direction of children’s 
actions to themselves and to others, could further articulate the ways in which action could 
support developing pretense re-presentation 
4.10 CONCLUSIONS 
Let’s examine a colloquial expression.  What are we really asking for when we see someone 
holding an object and ask, “Can I see it?”  We don’t want to actually look at it.  We already are 
seeing it.  If we didn’t see it, we wouldn’t know to ask for it.  So, seeing it is clearly not what 
we’re asking for.  What we want to do is hold it.  We want to feel its weight, its texture.    We 
want to know what it feels like when we move with it.  We want to turn it over, examine it and to 
move it by manipulate it with our hands.   That is how we “see” it in a very real and full way.  
Our motor perception and visual perception are as tightly coupled as action and representation.  
This is embodied cognition.   
When children pretend, they too want to hold objects and to move with them.  Pretend 
play is a physical and active process.  Toddlers do not merely sit and imagine pretend worlds 
without moving.  Furthermore, their action is not just the mere consequence of their pretend 
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representations.  Children create and develop their capacity for pretend representations through 
their actions and social partners support them in this goal.   This ability then opens a door into a 
world of possibility where any object can become something else in a child’s imagination.     
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